Masochism, Submission, Surrender—Masochism as a Perversion of Surrender

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SURRENDER, IN STRIKING CONTRAST TO masochism, is a word that is seldom encountered in the psychoanalytic literature, and even then it often bears an ambiguous meaning. My goal in this paper is to give the term a certain clarity of definition and to study its relation to submission and masochism, which I regard as antitheses to surrender. In order to span the full compass of the meaning I give to surrender, my plan is to broaden the scope implied by the title and touch on some other issues that are related to surrender: object usage (Winnicott, 1969) and its perversion in the form of sadism, creativity, and the apperception of threatening meaning.

Let me say at the outset that by masochism I mean all that is customarily intended by the term including both its sexual and characterological meanings. By perversion I mean something akin to distortion, corruption, diversion, misconstruction. The meaning I will give to the term "surrender" has nothing to do with hoisting a white flag; in fact, rather than carrying a connotation of defeat, the term will convey a quality of liberation and expansion of the self as a corollary to the letting down of defensive barriers. I hope the meaning of surrender, in its most inclusive sense, will gradually reveal itself as we encounter it in a variety of contexts. Nor am I convinced that "surrender" is the right word for what I would like to convey. Alternative words will crop up from time to time and perhaps help give form to the conception.

The thrust of this paper is not to challenge or discredit the vast literature on masochism and the ever sharpening insight into its psychic functions and meanings, but to attempt to illumine the shroud of mystery that still hangs over this curious human phenomenon—the seeking out of submission, pain or adversity—by drawing attention to another dimension that in my view plays a major and often deeply buried role in its varied expressions.

By way of circling around the meaning of surrender I would like first to draw upon a paper by Michael Eigen (1981), a remarkable analysis of the work of Winnicott, Lacan and Bion in which he locates a dimension of faith that underlies some of their most basic conceptions. "By the area of faith," Eigen says, "I mean to point to a way of experiencing which is undertaken with one's whole being, all out, 'with one's heart, with one's soul, and with all one's might.'" Faith, surrender, the beginnings of creativity and symbol formation all intersect in the world of transitional experiencing "when the infant lives through a faith that is prior to a clear realization of self and other differences."

Later, with object usage, there comes a new awakening in which "the core sense of creativeness that permeates transitional experiencing is reborn on a new level, insofar as genuine not-me nutriment becomes available for personal use." One might imagine the subject saying to the object, "I went all out, completely vulnerable, in the faith [or surrender] that someone was out there—and it turned out to be true, as I could only have known by destroying you with all my might, and yet here you are. I love you."
Throughout this paper I imply that there is, however deeply buried or frozen, a longing for something in the environment to make possible the surrender, in the sense of yielding, of false self. "For this to occur," Winnicott (1954) says, there must be "a belief in the possibility of a correction of the original failure represented by a latent capacity for regression." Here, regression and surrender are close relatives.

In describing the course of an analysis, Winnicott (1954) wrote, "The false self gradually became a 'caretaker self,' and only after years could a caretaker self become handed over to the analyst, the self surrender to the ego. … The theory is being put forward of regression as part of the healing process" (p. 281). The yearning for surrender of this false self is emphasized by Winnicott: "The organization that makes regression useful has this quality distinct from the other defense organizations in that it carries with it the hope of a new opportunity (italics mine) for an unfreezing ..." (Winnicott, 1954). My point here has been to highlight the centrality, despite its buried secrecy, of a longing for the birth, or perhaps re-birth, of true self.

As tags of meaning begin to attach to our notion of surrender, it seems to take on the sense of being in some way the obverse of resistance. Resistance is the name given to motivational forces operating against growth or change and in the direction of maintenance of the status quo. Surrender might be thought of as reflective of some "force" towards growth, for which, interestingly, no satisfactory English word exists. Submission, on the other hand, either operates in the service of resistance, or is at best adaptive as an expedient. The superstructure of defensiveness, the protections against anxiety, shame, guilt, anger are, in a way, all deceptions, whether they take the form of denial, splitting, repression, rationalizations, evasions. Is it possible that deep down we long to give this up, to "come clean," as part of an even more general longing to be known, recognized? Might this longing also be joined by a corresponding wish to know and recognize the other? As to the developmental origins of such longings I would locate them as being rooted in the primacy of object-seeking as a central motivational thrust in humans.

To develop further the meaning of surrender, some features that characterize it may be enumerated:

1. It does not necessarily require another person's presence, except possibly as a guide. One may surrender "in the presence of another," not "to another" as in the case of submission.

2. Surrender is not a voluntary activity. One cannot choose to surrender, though one can choose to submit. One can provide facilitative conditions for surrender but cannot make it happen.

3. It may be accompanied by a feeling of dread and death, and/or clarity, relief, even ecstasy.

4. It is an experience of being "in the moment," totally in the present, where past and future, the two tenses that require "mind" in the sense of secondary processes, have receded from consciousness.

5. Its ultimate direction is the discovery of one's identity, one's sense of self, one's sense of wholeness, even one's sense of unity with other living beings. This is quite unlike submission in which the reverse happens: one feels one's self as a puppet in the power of another; one's sense of identity atrophies.

6. In surrender there is an absence of domination and control; the reverse is true in the case of submission.

It is worth noting here the relation between healing, making whole, and holy, all of which are etymological cognates. In this connection note Winnicott's (1971, pp. 28–29) description of false self as "missing the boat," or at times simply as "missing," "being absent." In the old testament the Hebrew word designating sin has as its literal meaning to miss as in "missing the boat," "missing an opportunity to be present, alive" (Fromm, 1966, p. 132). The cure for missing is to become whole through surrender; the cure for sinning, in this sense, is to come alive, to be present in full awareness, authentic, centered in true self, holy. Rycroft (1966) has observed that "there would seem to be no necessary incompatibility between psychoanalysis and those religious formulations which locate God within the self. One could, indeed, argue that Freud's Id (and even more Groddeck's It), the impersonal force within which is both the core of oneself and yet not oneself, and from which in illness one becomes alienated, is a secular formulation of the insight which makes religious people believe in an immanent God ..."
It is easily confused with submission and often confounded with it for exploitative purposes. Certainly in life they are often found together. Considering the central thesis of this paper, that submission be viewed as a defensive mutant of surrender, this juxtaposition should not be surprising. (Nonetheless they are intrinsically very different.)

8. The distinction I am making between surrender and submission helps clarify another pair that are often confused. Resignation accompanies submission; it is heavy and lugubrious. Acceptance can only happen with surrender. It transcends the conditions that evoked it. It is joyous in spirit and, like surrender, it happens; it cannot be made to happen.

In the West surrender has meant "defeat." In the East it has meant transcendence, liberation. In the West "ego", as used in the vernacular, has meant one's strength, rationality, a very close relative, until recently, of one's self. In the East "ego" has meant maya, (dream, the illusion of one's self), a concept close to Lacan's "the Imaginary" or Winnicott's "unit self" world of identifications and projections, or Fairbairn's closed inner world. The goal in all of these systems is the awakening from the "dream world." In the East, to quote Heinrich Zimmer (1954), "the primary concern—in striking contrast to the interest of modern philosophers of the West—has always been, not information but transformation, a radical changing of man's nature and … a renovation of his understanding both of the outer world and of his own existence." Perhaps we see vestiges of this distinction in the schism between analysts whose emphasis is informational (insight is what cures) as against those for whom the focus is transformational (with cure comes insight). Seen in this light the controversial "short hour" of Lacan acquires new meaning, its intent and sometimes effect being to at least momentarily awaken the analysand from the world of the Imaginary, the dream … and perhaps provide a glimpse of something closer to the Real.

It has been said that there are no gurus, only disciples. The guru an illusion—an illusion which permits the disciple to yield, surrender false self, and therein have a chance at finding himself. The process may be thought of as allowing the disciple to re-enter the exhilarating world of transitional experiencing—wherein the guru is the transitional object. The "ego," false self, "mind" wants to argue; the guru won't argue. He knows that all engagement at this level reinforces the strength of the "ego" (false self). Surrender in this sense does not need a guru. The indirect object of the surrender could as well be a tree, the sun, God … anything or anyone that will not impinge with its own "ego." The process is what is important; the object to whom one surrenders is irrelevant. However, because we are so impressed by our "ego," we need to find something or someone who so totally transcends our experience, whose presence is so total and affirming that we will take a chance on surrendering. Hence the guru, and in a different world, the analyst. He is an excuse, an ally for true self to come forth.

For most of us in the West this notion of surrender is something so foreign as to be barely comprehensible. Perhaps a detour into the world of art or creativity in general will serve as a bridge to grope into the meaning of surrender as distinguished from submission. Marion Milner (1957), in paraphrasing Jacques Maritain (1953), says that "any 'explanation' of art which is only in terms of the context of repressed wishes … leaves out what is essential … to art. It leaves out this deliberately fostered getting in touch with, not just hidden wishes but a different way of functioning (italics added); and a way of functioning which is essential if something new is to be created."

In her book, On Not Being Able to Paint, Milner (1950) drew attention to another phenomenon that I would include under the umbrella of meaning provided by the word surrender. She speaks of "the blanking out of ordinary consciousness when one is able to break free from the familiar and allow a new unexpected entity to appear." One's ordinary sense of self seems temporarily to have disappeared. Composers often have the feeling that the musical idea comes from some source external to themselves; Mozart said he was not a composer, merely an amanuensis to God. This subjective "blanking out" as in the so-called oceanic feeling, or as "emptiness," the beneficent state of being that is at the center of the Tao, have been likened by analysts to the state of blissful satisfaction at mother's breast. Milner goes on to ask if these may not also reflect an essential part of the creative process, not just of painting, but of living: 'May they not be moments in which there is a plunge into no-differentiation which results (if all goes well) in a re-emerging into a new division of the me-not-me …?
I have already hinted at the notion that these phenomena that I am encompassing as surrender are not mere descriptions of a particular way of functioning, but are as well characterized by a quality of need, mostly operating out of awareness, yet seemingly with a relentlessness that is not easy to account for in traditional psychoanalytic terms. By "need" I am not implying that there is something like an inborn instinct for the integration of self. My view rather is that in normal development the most primitive functions and needs of the infant, when adequately responded to and interacted with by the environing others, give rise to ever more sophisticated and complex conative structures, which later we recognize as having the valence or motivational quality of need. Milner (1969), too, seems to imply something akin to a need, when towards the end of her deeply compelling book, The Hands of the Living God, she concludes, "Certainly, some patients seemed to be aware, dimly or increasingly, of a force in them to do with growth, growth towards their own shape, also as something that seemed to be sensed as driving them to break down false inner organizations which do not really belong to them; something which can also be deeply feared, as a kind of creative fury that will not let them rest content with a merely compliant adaptation; and also feared because of the temporary chaos it must cause when the integrations on a false basis are in process of being broken down in order that a better one may emerge" (italics added) (pp. 384–5).

We are left with many questions: Is this phenomenon a different kind of integrative force? If so, what is its nature, and what are its antecedents in the developing human? My hunch is that there is something like a universal need, wish or longing for what I am calling surrender and that it assumes many forms. In some societies there are culturally sanctioned occasions for its realization in the form of ecstatic rituals and healing trances. In other societies, perhaps most notably in Japan where the psychology of amae is so central to one's way of being, something akin to surrender is experienced as almost universally desired and desirable. In many people in our own culture the wish for surrender remains buried; in some it is expressed in creative and productive ways, and in others its derivatives appear in pathological form, deflected away from normal channels by that most unwelcome price-tag: dread. I suspect further that this dread is something that we have encountered in other contexts and have conceptualized as annihilation anxiety, dread of dissolution, ego fragmentation and so on. Perhaps what I am saying is that just as in so many other aspects of living, where there is a dread, so, too, there is a wish, a longing, however disguised its expression may be. Poets have captured in a line or two what takes the rest of us pages of gropings to contact. (Rilke, 1912, p. 21) confides in us about his experience of surrender when he writes

... For Beauty's nothing
but beginning of Terror we're still just able to bear, and why we adore it so is because it serenely
disdains to destroy us.

The intimate relation between dread and wish is as old as psychoanalysis. Guntrip (1969) spoke of ego dissolution in two seemingly opposite ways; it reflected the deepest dread and at the same time was inseparable from the ultimate longing of the frozen-in true self to be discovered. Eigen (1973) noticed with surprise how a number of patients had spontaneously undertaken periods of profound abstinence for the sake of their personal development.

*It was as though a reaction to the over-stimulating pleasure orientation had begun to set in. ... The practical-social milieu was viewed increasingly as lacking in crucial respects and discounted as a place one could want to take root in. Neither people nor things seemed any longer to offer the promise, pleasure or satisfaction 'similar' patients just some years before had compulsively sought. ... The process took place 'blindly' and was often frightening. Most generally, patients felt they were being drawn down out of the world as though by a magnet towards a sense of self they knew they had at bottom. ... Often a state of seemingly endless, painful emptiness preceded the clear experiencing of this* I-kernel.

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3I am grateful to Dr. Jean-Yves Roy of Montreal for having brought to my attention the work of Takeo Doi (1973), (1986) on the psychology of amae and its relation to the phenomenon of surrender. The word amae has variously been translated as dependence, a form of love, the play of indulgence. In some contexts, the verb amae ru conveys a meaning of surrender that resembles its usage in this paper. The amae psychology underpins a sense of oneness between mother and child, and plays an indispensable role in the development of a healthy spiritual life (Doi, 1973, p. 75). Zen satori (enlightenment) might be looked upon as an affirmation of amae (p. 77). The person who seeks amae often experiences frustration with the result that some people turn to Zen and other religions, while others out of a similar motivation are driven to the pursuit of beauty (p. 79). In the West, freedom has usually meant freedom from dependence, and we see it in the celebration of autonomy at the expense of human connection. At the root of the amae psychology of the East is the reverse emphasis: the freedom to bond, rather than the Western focus on freedom from bondage (pp. 84ff).
Many therapists would be frightened by this, viewing it as either depression or withdrawal or even a heralding of psychosis. As I understand it, however, what Eigen is describing is a phase in successful analysis when the patient begins to get in touch with what Winnicott (1965) referred to as that "true, silent, inviolable self, beyond all usual communication with the outside world." The self structure described by Eigen (1973), unlike the regressed ego of Guntrip, is "intensely alive and active. … It is experienced in an aura of power. … The respite here is not passivity in the womb, not a sleep, but an active seeing stillness, compact and electrifying."

The main hypothesis of this paper is that it is this passionate longing to surrender that comes into play in at least some instances of masochism. Submission, losing oneself in the power of the other, becoming enslaved in one or other way to the master, is the ever available lookalike to surrender. It holds out the promise, seduces, excites, enslaves, and in the end, cheats the seeker-turned-victim out of his cherished goal, offering in its place only the security of bondage and an ever amplified sense of futility. By substituting the appearance and trappings of surrender for the authentic experience, an agonizing, though at times temporarily exciting, masquerade of surrender occurs: a self-negating submissive experience in which the person is enthralled by the other. The intensity of the masochism is a living testimonial of the urgency with which some buried part of the personality is screaming to be exhumed. This is not to be minimized as an expression of the longing to be healed, although so often we bear witness to its recurring miscarriage.

Having put forth a substantial portion of my thesis, it now feels essential to place it in perspective. The literature on masochism is vast and this is clearly not the place for a critical review. In the early years of psychoanalysis masochism was seen essentially as an expression of drive derivatives, or as a superego phenomenon (Freud, 1924). Later, based on the work of Reich (1933), Horney (1935), Berliner (1947), Menaker (1953) among others, it was seen as a defensive reaction of the ego. Brenman (1952) showed how masochism served a multiplicity of functions at the same time. Stolorow and Lachmann (1980) add yet another function: that "masochistic activities may … represent abortive (and sometimes primitively sexualized) efforts to restore and maintain the structural cohesion, temporal stability, and positive affective coloring of a precarious or crumbling self representation" (p. 30). The formulation I am suggesting is not intended to replace others but to add a depth of focus to them. It has a paradoxical relation to the self-psychology formulation in that it implies in the long run a strengthening, a wholling of the self; on the other hand, it implies that a surrender, a controlled dissolution of self-boundaries is at times sought, not only feared; that the masochistic phenomena are symptoms of the derailment or distortion of a wish, not just the defense against a fear. As in Eigen's (1981) formulation about The Area of Faith in Winnicott, Lacan and Bion, there is a tone of sought-after vitality and joy, rather than escape from doom.

Masochistic phenomena have often been traced to deprivation, traumata and developmental interferences suffered in the early preoedipal years. Stolorow and Lachmann (1980, pp. 30–31) suggest that these early traumata would also leave their mark by interfering with the development of a cohesive and stable self-representation. The masochistic tendency then would serve to shore up the lack of cohesion of the self. An alternative view might be that in response to these early traumata a false self based on compliance is built up. This eventuates in a continuing longing to surrender this false self in the hope of a "new beginning" (Balint, 1968). Any movement in this direction would likely lead to the re-experience of the mortification and annihilation anxiety that first led to the development of the false self. One might expect a certain "invitation" of masochism and a submissive attitude, "mistaking" submission for surrender, since submission, as in the perversion of surrender, is the closest the person has likely come to knowing about surrender. Winnicott (1974), in The Fear of Breakdown, threw further light on what I am generically calling the longing to surrender. In effect, he identified the fear of breakdown as really being the fear of re-experiencing, and the wish to re-experience, the breakdown that has already occurred so early in life that it cannot be remembered. I will deal with this more fully in connection with the role of surrender in the apperception of meaning.

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4 For purposes of expressive clarity I will at times use the masculine pronoun generically; it is not intended to convey any gender significance.
An appropriate question arises from this mélange of masochism and surrender. What are the roots in experience that eventuate in this clinical picture? Perhaps a partial answer is to be found in an earlier paper by Winnicott (1950–55, pp. 211 ff.) a study on what he called motility and what we might now call activity, or assertiveness. He described three patterns. In one, the healthy pattern, through motility the world outside the baby is constantly being discovered and re-discovered so that contact with the environment is an experience of the individual. Only under these conditions may the individual start to exist. In the second pattern the environment impinges on the baby and instead of a series of individual experiences there is a series of reactions to impingement. Under these circumstances, only withdrawal allows an individual existence.

In a third pattern, which is extreme, this is exaggerated to such a degree that there is not even a resting place for individual experience, and the result is a failure in the primary narcissistic state to evolve an individual. The 'individual' then develops as an extension of the shell rather than of the core, and as an extension of the impinging environment. ... The individual then exists by not being found.

In the second and third patterns it is only through environmental impingement that the motility potential becomes a matter or experience. Here is ill health. To a lesser or greater degree the individual must be opposed and only if opposed [I would add: or imposed upon] does the individual tap the important motility source. This is satisfactory while environment consistently impinges, but environmental impingement must continue ... and must have a pattern of its own, else chaos reigns, since the individual cannot develop a personal pattern" (italics all in the original).

For our purposes, what bears emphasis is that in the second and third pattern the individual or "non-individual" that has developed in an atmosphere of impingement has a continuing need for environmental impingement. I believe Winnicott is identifying here at least one source of the masochistic syndrome, pointing to the need for patterned impingement. Is this a euphemism suggestive of a need to be the object of sadistic experience? "Impingement" is not far from "penetration." The deeper yearning, which remains invisible behind compulsive masochistic activity (in itself needed to forestall chaos or disintegration), is the longing to be reached and known, in an accepting and safe environment. The individual then becomes free to use his or her own motility to discover and be discovered in such a way that contact with the environment can become an "experience of the individual."

Fantasies of being raped can have all manner of meanings, often superimposed. Among them, in my clinical experience, one will almost always find, sometimes deeply buried, a yearning for what I am calling surrender. Erotic fantasies in relation to the analyst (usually, but by no means only, in the case of a female patient with male analyst) or the wish to make love with the analyst so very often turns out to have as its root the intense longing to surrender in the sense of giving over, yielding the defensive superstructure, being known, found, penetrated, recognized. The closest most of us come to the experience of surrender is in the moment of orgasm with a loved one. Little surprise it should be then for the sexual scene to be the desired focus for such letting-go. It is not primarily the sex that is longed for except as the vehicle for the glimpse of surrendered bliss that we are speaking of. Sometimes the roles are reversed and the fantasy is of the analyst's total surrender with the patient. This turns out ultimately to be a half-way house on the way to the ultimate longed-for goal of self-surrender and being known in one's nakedness. Often the erotic fantasies have a distinctly masochistic flavor, as, for example, in being forced, tricked, seduced into lovemaking, or being overpowered by the sheer masterfulness of the other. The masochistic expression here is the disguise, or what I am calling the perversion of the wish for surrender. If by mischance the analyst should enter into the patient's real world in sexual response, the masochism of the patient soon flourishes, and all hope of what the patient had really longed for, genuine surrender, is lost. The fantasy of rape is a foil for the disguised expression of the longing for surrender. Real rape, be it by the penis, or the "ego" (psychological rape, no matter how subtle), violently forecloses and, by not recognizing or not caring about the genuine longing, has deeply betrayed it. It is important to emphasize that I am not trying to reduce the entirety of an erotic transference to this dynamic; many other layers are often involved and have to be dealt with.

The sexual arena is not the only area where passionate, even ecstatic intensity lends itself to being a masochistic substitute for surrender. The excitement of recklessness or dangerous, near-death activities is another, as is the pull to manifest infantilism and helpless demandingness. Both of these quasi-masochistic configurations—and there are others—can be very intense and can function as disguised expression of the longing for surrender.
In the analytic situation this longing for, dread of, and pain in, surrender is most frequently first encountered in the defensive reactions that are designed to contain the impulse, a kind of compromise where the impulse is deflected and only appears in some disguised, distorted form. Sometimes the patient, experiencing the beginnings of the dread we are speaking of, attributes it to the dangerousness of the analyst, his or her intrusiveness, malevolence, empathic unresponsiveness, seductiveness. Often enough, some expressions of these features may well appear and even be fanned by an intensifying transference-countertransference interaction. An erotic transference may develop, or a paranoid transference, or masochistic or sadistic acting out, even a variety of negative therapeutic reaction. But what is common to all of these manifestations of the impulse towards, and dread of, surrender is some aspect of masochism.

Perhaps a few vignettes will illustrate what I mean by masochism as a perversion of surrender. A borderline young woman, exceedingly demanding, whiny and manipulative, left the session with an involuntary smile saying "That was a good session," implying that this time, in contrast to all others, I had not failed her. During the session I had remained firm but gentle against a barrage of demands and complaints. At one point I had said "You know, I somehow think that if you had your way you would feel deeply disappointed." She smiled involuntarily and after a long, very unwonted silence, said, "You mean if I win, I lose?" I said, "The part of you that's hiding, and we're trying to find, she's the loser." Another long silence. Next day her first words were, "You really got through to me" and then reported with much embarrassment, that after the session she had gone home, beat herself, forced a stick into her anus and masturbated with fantasies of being tortured. My understanding of the sequence was that she had felt her defensive barrier come down, there had been a glimpse into the possible existence of an undefended lovable self and with it the nascent excitement of a beginning surrender. Quickly the impulse to surrender had to be redefined in terms of false self, as its masochistic counterpart. Feeling reached, known, "gotten through to" was translated into 'penetrated' (in its ambiguous meaning) and beaten. A momentary new reality was translated back into the old familiar inner reality; the impulse to surrender (she had often said, "Please do not let me fool you") had to be experienced as its perversion, masochism.

A professional woman of 30 dreamed, "I am hiding under the table from what seems to be the forces of repression, Franco men. There is a man with a gun there. He had a black beard. I had to get a secret message, a very important message that concerned the secret location of our forces, to an older man. I was extremely nervous and did not think I would be able to do it; yet actually I did. Still I felt I had not done well enough." Among the various meanings reflected in the dream is the one that concerns us here: that the very impulse to be known, to get the vital message through to the analyst about her secret inner strength—this impulse had to be experienced in the context of pain and the dread of being killed or raped. It is as if this woman (as the masochist) needs the powerful force of violence, the fascist with the gun (that is, the image of the analyst as sadist), because only under his presence and force is she able to get the secret to the old man. In other words, "I have to invite danger and perhaps sex with the analyst, that is, be the masochist, in order to provide the cover for getting the secret message to the analyst, the wish to surrender and be known.

Masud Khan (1973) makes the convincing point that "all perversions accrue from a symbiotic complicity between two persons, which is both unconscious and empathic." He then goes on to describe in his characteristically vivid style a young woman who had for years been in a state of inertia and depression. Slowly but surely she was won over by a man who tantalized, excited her to intense passion, and degraded her; in his power she felt totally helpless. Khan notes, however, how the relationship with the lover helped her exteriorize her psychic pain and her rage, and furthermore, initiated experience for her. He reflects on how the pervert has a great advantage over a therapist in being able to mobilize the "passive will" in a person inasmuch as he can initiate and execute experiences through his "active will." Nonetheless, the therapist is not without the exercise of his will and power, as manifested for example by the various demands made by the analytic setup, which, if not adhered to, the analyst treats as resistance.
During the course of therapy, this same patient began asking him frequent questions as to how she should behave in various social situations. When these went unanswered, the patient would withdraw into a state not unlike the original depressed, apathetic state that preceded the love affair. "Once I had decided to answer her questions," Khan observes, "what followed was very revealing. She would instantly accept and agree to what I said. But then she would play around (original italics) with what I had said: question and correct it until she would find the right solution for herself. I was very struck by her capacity to play with different possibilities of conduct, once I had suggested a course. If I abstained she would invariably go inert and become resourceless. This use of the analyst's will and power with which she could identify and internalize, proved extremely helpful to her." My reading of the situation is that the patient had identified with the analyst's power in the sense that she became the "active will," and he yielded (surrendered) to her initiative in such a way that there developed, to use Winnicott's words, "an area of play in the analytic situation" (Winnicott, 1968).

Khan asks, "How was playing in the 'analytic contract' different for this patient from participating in 'games' that her lover had made her an accomplice to during her 'perverted contract'?" He then answers: "The crucial difference seemed to lie in the different use of the patient by her lover and by her analyst. … Her lover compelled her into the role of his 'subjective object.'" That is, he forced her to play a passive part in his inner drama.

He had to devalue and disrupt all functions in her that gave her a separate identity and existence. … What she had experienced was merely an intensely excited and passive surrender to his will. … In the analytic contract, per contrast, she sought help to be enabled to find her own will and power in her life situation. The empathy she required was in the service of the actualization of her own capacities and functions towards personal autonomy (p. 208).

To return to the theme of this presentation, I would describe her relation to her lover not at all as surrender but as that of submission, a pseudo-surrender, a masochistic object of the sadist. Anna Freud (1952) has diagnosed the emotional predicament in perversion formation as the dread of emotional surrender. It is surrender, in the sense I have defined, that the patient was longing for, the wish to be found, recognized, penetrated to the core, so as to become real, or as Winnicott put it in another context "to come into being."

In this case with the lover we witness the perversion of the process, where instead of the patient's autonomy being freed and her identity found, she becomes a captive puppet. With the analyst, on the other hand, a mild kind of surrender, again in the sense that I mean it, has occurred, incidentally on the part of the analyst as well as the patient, with the result that the patient feels found, enriched and more whole.

Sadism as a Perversion of Object Usage

It is difficult to do justice in a few paragraphs to Winnicott's concept of object usage (Winnicott, 1969) as against object relating. Yet, as a preamble to the question whether there is a formulation for sadism analogous to the one I am proposing for masochism, it merits review. In transitional experiencing the mother allows, encourages, the infant to bathe in the illusion that she or some part of her is part of baby. With the evolution of creative play and the very gradual disillusion by the mother, the baby discovers and in effect, creates, bit by bit, both self and external reality. In object relating both self and other are perceived largely through projections and identifications. The self at this stage may be thought of as a "unit self" in that relating can be described in terms of an "isolate," the individual subject; the object then is the subjectively perceived object. The use of an object, object-usage, however takes object-relating for granted. New features enter that involve the nature and behavior of the object in external reality. "The object, if it is to be used, must necessarily be real in the sense of being part of shared reality, not a bundle of projections" (p. 88). Winnicott (p. 89) gives an almost diagrammatic example:

Two babies are feeding at the breast; one is feeding on the self in the form of projections, and the other is feeding on (using) milk from a woman's breast. … The change does not come about automatically, by maturational process alone. … Mothers, like analysts, can be good or not good enough; some can and some cannot carry the baby over from relating to usage. [This transition] is the most difficult thing, perhaps, in human development … [and] the most irksome of all the early failures that come for mending. … The change [from relating to use] means that the subject destroys the object [as subjective object] and the object, if it survives destruction, is now real. … 'Hullo object!' 'I destroyed you.' 'I love you.' 'You have value for me because of your survival of my destruction of you.'
In effect, destruction has created the reality, placed the object outside the self. The word 'destruction' may seem out of place here in what might naively appear to be a piece of straightforward development. Yet it is needed "not because of the baby's impulse to destroy, but because of the object's liability not to survive" (Winnicott, 1969). The varieties of non-survival include retaliation, withdrawal, defensiveness in any of its forms, as overall change in attitude in the direction of suspiciousness or diminished receptivity, and finally, a kind of crumbling, in the sense of its losing one's capacity to function adequately as mother, or in the analytic setting, as analyst.

This conception of development involving the difficult passage from object relating to object use implies a radical departure from the usual analytic notion that aggression is reactive to the encounter with external reality (the reality principle). Here it is destructiveness that creates the very quality of externality.

But the main reason for this discussion of the development of the capacity for object usage is to explore its relation to surrender, masochism, and now, sadism. The essence of both transitional experiencing and the transition into object usage is the heady and wonderful world of creative experiencing wherein self and other have the opportunity to become real. Failures in either or both of these developmental currents lead to the development of one or other variety of false self; from the baby's point of view they might well be called failures of faith.

A principal cause of failure in transitional experiencing is what has already been referred to as impingement by the caretaker. We have seen how this intrusiveness interferes with true experiencing or "coming into being," with the distressing result that for the infant to "exist," continuing impingement is required. Here we saw the beginnings of masochism. I have suggested also that in many people there is an impulse to surrender, perhaps in order to reengage that area of transitional experiencing, the miscarriage of which impulse or longing appears as masochism or submission.

I now suggest the possibility that failure of the transition from object relating to object usage would result from a different (but probably related) failure of the caretaker: retaliation, defensiveness, negativity on the part of the caretaker or crumbling of her or his effectiveness. In either case the triple misfortune is that the subjective object never becomes real but remains a bundle of projections, and externality is not discovered; as a corollary the subject is now made to feel that he or she is destructive; and finally, fear and hatred of the other develops, and with them, characterological destructiveness comes into being. In short we have the setting for the development of sadism (in what remains a unit self, a self as isolate), the need to aggressively control the other as a perversion of object usage, much as we have seen in masochism as a perversion of surrender. An excerpt from a session will perhaps add a little flesh and blood:

_I desperately want you to stay in control no matter how hard "the mouth with teeth" tries to destroy you—not destroy you as a person, but as a competent analyst. I need you to be strong, to never "explain" anything. If you explain, I feel it as defensive and, therefore I am back in control and I have forced you to defend yourself. The mouth that babbles on vindictively and vengefully needs to be allowed out and to be here. Don't tell him to give up control. He also wants to give up control but will do so only if he feels your strength not to be afraid of him in his full presence._

There is a reciprocity here—a wish for surrender (which in this excerpt reveals only hints at masochism), a plea for what we have been calling object usage, and an awareness that what now exists as biting sadism is a derivative of the wish to discover the reality of the other, and thereby truly experience the self.

Here we see an outreaching, penetrative version of surrender. Earlier we saw how a defensive mutation of the longing to be recognized, deeply known, penetrated, a desire for what might be called "receptive" surrender, becomes transformed into a seeming quest for submission, submergence of self. Now we come upon another version of surrender, the complement of the earlier variety. We see it here in the desire to deeply know, penetrate, discover the other. One might say that the longing is to dive deeply into the other, or in Winnicott's terms, "use" the other, and discover what might be called "true other" in contrast to the false other. False other corresponds either to the false image of the other or the false self of the other. If the other has not been destroyed in the process, false other turns out to be (or to have been) the false image or representation of the other. On the other hand, if the other was destroyed, rendered useless, then the false other corresponds in all probability to the false self of the other.
Use of an object is not a very felicitous expression, because it too closely resembles the vernacular "using the other as a sexual object," as well as "objectification." Perhaps better words to express Winnicott's meaning would be un-cover, dis-cover, penetrate. Unfortunately, except for "penetrate," these do not easily permit the ambiguity that "use" affords wherein attack may be the effect, although not at all the intended goal, which by contrast is to discover, or to un-cover the real other in lieu of the subjective other. We seem to need a word as a container of the meaning that resides in both aspects of the phenomenon under discussion, what might be called the autoplastic and the alloplastic versions of surrender. The lack of such a word points up the foreignness of these conceptions to our ordinary way of thinking. Perhaps this is an expression of the awkwardness in our own language of expressing the opposite of intentionality, a state of being that is not marked by active conscious goal-seeking. Even in expressing this thought I seem to require locutions that frame it in terms of what it is not. Yet the frequency with which reference is made in the psychoanalytic literature to Keats' famous lines "on negative capability" (Rosen, 1960), Green (1973), Hutter (1982), attests to its being a focus of some importance.

The sexual experience can be, for example, an instance where the meaning of surrender and object usage almost lose their distinctive meaning, and blend. On the surface it appears as though the woman is surrendered, and the man "using the object," that is, active. But in the kind of interaction we are speaking of, each is surrendered and one might say, involved in object usage, in the sense of un-covering, dis-covering the reality of the other.

In my view love and hate are not opposites. The real polarity is between love and fear. Only when there is no fear, love flourishes. When fear or anxiety is present, it often becomes manifest in a reactive and compensatory form as hatred (or indifference), with the result that love and hate (or love and indifference) appear to be the polarities. The successful use of the object, or being used by the object in the form of surrender, is one's bid at overcoming the fear of the other. Hence, the successful use and surrender, in which both survive the use and have therefore transcended fear of the other, are necessary precursors in the development of love. In fact, a deep sense of love is what is actually felt in either of these experiences.

The Apperception of Disorganizing Meaning

I would like now to shift focus and explore the relevance of our notion of surrender to another group of phenomena. The area I am looking at has to do with what might be called the apperception of disorganizing meaning, and has bearing on the so-called repetition compulsion and the question of identification. We encounter, daily, in our practice the phenomenon of a patient who can say, "my mother was sadistic," and describe events to nail down the assertion, and yet one has the impression that the patient ends up with the feeling of "but somehow I can't believe it's true." The patient seems not to have been able to "take in" the perception of what he or she has witnessed. It is as if the perception would shatter the prevailing belief system and induce chaos were a complete perceptual letting-go to occur, a surrender to the experience. A total revision of one's perception of, in this case, mother, would have to happen in which the image of mother being sadistic would reside alongside and integrated with other images of mother.

A brief illustration. Many years ago, while vacationing in the country, my 3-year-old niece noticed that my knee was scratched and bleeding slightly. She immediately said, "Oh! Blood! You have a cut. (slight pause). I'll go get you a band-aid. (slight pause). How did it happen?" I, jokingly: "We were playing in the sand and your mom pushed me!" She: "There's no cut. I don't see any blood." I: "That was just a joke; your mom didn't push me; I fell." She (greatly relieved): "That blood needs a band-aid." She immediately went off to fetch a band-aid. The story well illustrates that if a perception is threatening to a belief, either the belief or the perception has to go. In this case the idea that good mommy could cause harm to someone was so unacceptable that the perception, as long as it carried significance that would be disorganizing, had to be denied. In other words it could not be "taken in." In older children and adults a perception may be registered but its significance denied; we refer to this as the mechanism of isolation.
Another way of looking at this process is that the child's developing perceptual and cognitive skills probably outgrow the meanings he or she can safely take in. Surrender to "what is" would, in some instances, lead to a disorganizing, threatening state of being. A compromise develops, driven by the wish to surrender to the perception, and opposed by the threat it implies. The result is the masochistic solution; recurring situations are created in which each fresh opportunity for clarity is subverted by the dread, which by now is so shrouded in history as to feel nameless and "existential." Again, as we have seen earlier in our discussion of surrender, the dread and the wish are two sides of the same coin. The wish is to return to the scene of the dread and expresses not so much the wish "to master the experience" as to integrate the experience.

In effect, I am suggesting that some instances of masochism may be rooted in a deep quest for understanding, for undoing the isolation. It is as if with one mind the person is setting up situations in which he is "done in" or caused pain by the other, an authority, friend, lover, and with the other, is struggling with the inner question that remains tantalizingly unanswered: What happened? How did it happen? A loved one could not have done that to me! That is inconceivable. Then how did it happen? He did it! … but somehow I cannot "take it in." It just cannot be. Maybe next time I can create a situation that's more clear. … Then I will be able to "take it in, perceive, conceive it."

Masochism, rather than being an expression of some "aggressive drive turned inward" may, at least in some circumstances, be a distorted representation of what I have called the wish to surrender, or as in this context, to confront and "take in" the inner truth, to perceive self and other as they really are, that is, without regard to the false selves erected out of compliance to early authorities. This compulsion to repeat, masochistically, self-destructive behavior may turn out to be another form of trying to "take in" some reality, in this case the unthinkable destructiveness of a significant other. The act of "taking in" may involve a considerable degree of disorganization in order for this to be possible and, by analogy to the creative moment in art, it may mean that one has to give up, surrender the conventionalized "surface mind" view of an object, a tree or whatever, and allow the gestalt free "depth mind" (Ehrenzweig, 1953) to take over. This may mean a transition to a period of chaos in the "depth mind" before the new reality can be taken in and comprehended or expressed.

In discussing the negative therapeutic reaction, Esther Menaker (1969, p. 90) touches on this very question even using the same expression, "take in." She writes, "the patient is faced with the single ultimate choice: will he choose growth or refuse it—can he take in what is (italics added), permit the resultant disorganization of the status quo of the self …? " (original italics).

There is more yet to be said about this issue, the wish and dread of "taking in" experience. I am thinking of Winnicott's "axiom" (Davis and Wallbridge, 1981, p. 50) that " The clinical fear of breakdown is the fear of breakdown that has already been experienced " (Winnicott, 1974) (original italics). He asks,

> Why does the patient go on being worried by this that belongs to the past? The answer must be that the original experience of primitive agony cannot get into the past tense unless the ego can first gather it in [cf. "take it in"] to its own present time experience and into omnipotent control now (assuming the auxiliary ego-supporting function of the mother (analyti)). … In other words, the patient must go on looking for the past detail which is not yet experienced.

This search takes the form of looking for this detail in the future.

Winnicott (1974) goes on to extend this fear of breakdown to related issues such as the fear of death (annihilation) and the feelings of emptiness and non-existence. He adds, "When Keats was 'half in love with easeful death' he was, according to the idea I am putting forward here, longing for the ease that would have come if he could 'remember' [or I would add, 'take in'] having died; but to remember he must experience death now."
"Beinglessness" was the word discovered recently by a patient as he was groping for the sensation that crept over him like death when no one was there to assuage the urgent needy feelings for someone to "fill him up," to continuously affirm his existence. "It looks like I need admiration," he said, "but that's not it; it's as if I need someone to keep telling me I'm alive—or else I sink into horror—just that horror that I could feel the beginnings of when the word 'beinglessness' came to me." As deep as the dread of that state, so too is the pull to revisit it, to dig around the edges of it. I am suggesting that by reaching into the is-ness of the circumstances that led to that horror, or the events that did not happen that might have otherwise brought him into being, he is unconsciously seeking a chance to come solidly into being. As the session in question came to a close the patient said, "I have to hold onto this place and never forget it. If I lose it would be like the most important page of a book torn out. The book would be meaningless." Although in this instance it did not happen, the search, the wishing for surrender to experience, may miscarry, and in its miscarried forms may well bear the marks of masochism.

I would like now to address a related issue, another outcome that may result from the incomplete "taking-in" of experiences whose full and meaningful apperception would be disorganizing. This outcome is usually thought of as "identification with the aggressor." But what does this phrase mean? How does it happen? I have found myself wondering if the wish to perceive, "take in," comprehend something may require a certain quality of activity. It has long been known that in order to perceive a triangle, the child first has to move his eyes from point to point, and, eventually, after many repetitions of this motoric act, he becomes able to perceive and, still later, to conceive, a triangle (Hebb, 1949). Schilder (1964) similarly ties motility with perception. "Primitive perception is a state of motion. … Development is in the direction of the elimination of the inner motion of the perception." If what is being perceived would require inner disorganization to a degree greater than the child can handle, is it possible that a child does something analogous to what a painter does in trying to express an aspect of reality that is beyond formulation? The painter uses his available medium, paint, to represent "the unthinkable." Could it be that the child or infant uses his available medium, his quite plastic self as his medium, separates part of it and makes a creative representation of what he has partially perceived in the external reality? Is this perhaps another example of how, under adverse environmental conditions, the impulse to surrender, in this case the let-go, the taking-in, of this is-ness of the "unthinkable" situation, goes awry, now resulting not simply in masochism, but in an identification with the aggressor in whatever style characterizes the aggressor.

Many of us have had the experience of a spouse or good friend chiding us in irritation, "You are behaving just like your father!" If and when we recover from our injured innocence and reflect on the event in question, we, at times, with a little self-analysis, discover exactly what unique version of subtle hostility we were engaging in. At that moment, if we are lucky, another insight may break into consciousness with the thought, "Oh, I see! So that's what father was up to when he did such and such!" The identificatory process has finally paid off; it has at last revealed what one had not been able to see, "take in," recognize, or understand in the father.

In discussing Francis Bacon, "the skillful and challenging artist of our time who goes on and on painting the human face distorted significantly," Winnicott (1967, p. 114) conjectures, "In looking at faces he seems to need to be painfully striving towards being seen, which is at the basis of creative looking." I would like to add to the conjecture that he is painfully striving to perceive something that he has not dared to see. If this be the case, it would be a kind of intermediate example between the painter who represents with paint what he cannot "take in" and the child who does the same with his self.

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5I recently came across a paper by Minna Emch (1944) in which she describes a phenomenon in children that adds weight to this hypothesis. "When the … experience is one which cannot yet be assimilated by the child, the 'next best' tool at its command is the attempt to know through an attenuated repetition of the disturbing stimulus-experience, especially as it relates to the mediator of that experience." She adds that both observations of children and clinical material from adults indicate that this attempt at knowing, by acting out the likeness of a situation, takes place very early, and may result in patterns of astonishing mimicry and even the "most caustic of caricatures" (p. 14).
Surrender, Masochism and the Creative Process

I would like now to return to the notion shared by Ehrenzweig (1953) and Milner, that "this self-destruction is perhaps a distorted, because frustrated, form of self-surrender which is inherent in the creative process" (Milner, 1958). Much of Milner's analytic work has been an exploration into the pathology of the creative process. In particular her paper, *The Role of Illusion in Symbol Formation* (Milner, 1952) offers deeper insight into the meaning I have given to the word surrender. She describes a young girl of eleven who

_fervently and defiantly scribbled on every surface she could find. Although it looked as if it were done in anger, interpretation in terms of aggression only led to increase in the defiance. In fact, the apparent defiance did not change until I began to guess that the trouble was less to do with faeces given in anger and meant to express anger, than with faeces given in love and meant to express love (p. 106)._ 

Milner gradually came to look upon the scribbling in a fresh way:

_By refusing to discriminate, and claiming the right to scribble over everything, the young patient was trying to deny the discrepancy between the feeling [she experienced] and the expression if it; by denying completely my right to protect any of my property from defacement she was even trying to win me over to her original belief that when she gave her messes lovingly they were literally as lovely as the feelings she had in giving of them. ... She was struggling [with the problem of the identity of the symbol with the thing symbolized ...] with the very early problem of coming to discriminate ... between the lovely feeling in giving [making, creating] the mess and the mess itself (p. 107)._ 

Although this was written long before Winnicott's paper on object usage, it provides a wonderful example of a "good-enough analyst" who was able to carry this girl over the tortuous path from object relating to object usage. Had this not occurred, the child's efforts to discover the real object and thereby real self—(cleared of the debris of the identifications and projections that kept alive the con-fusion of symbol with thing symbolized)—would have been defined as sadistic; the patient would likely have developed into what we think of as a sadistic, narcissistic woman.

Fortunately, Milner's perspicacity enabled her to recognize the child's struggle with the agony of disillusion in giving up the belief that everyone must see in her dirt what she sees in it. Another patient, a young boy said, "'My people' are to see these empty trucks and 'think it's gods.' In fact, Milner muses, "he is saying what the poet Yeats said: 'Tread softly, because you tread on my dreams" (p. 107).

We ought also to "tread softly" on patients' masochism and submissiveness. These too are often expressing in a disguised and a distorted way a deep yearning to be found and recognized. Unlike Milner's children they are not so much defacing her walls as their own walls. They too are "struggling with the problem of the identity of the symbol and the thing symbolized, " in this case between the longing to yield control, to give up one's protective superstructure [as the thing symbolized) and inviting rape and other overpowering action (as the symbol).

We must note, of course, that acting out is no solution. It would not help Milner's patients if all she did was let the children scribble on the wall and celebrate the scribbles as their expressions of love. The same is true of submissive masochistic behavior. What is needed in both cases is that the patient get in touch with, and be validated in, the real longing to be recognized, known, perhaps penetrated with enough gentleness that the patient can feel safe enough to discover his or her own motility, while still having a symbolic foot in the need for continuing impingement, the absence of which would be so unfamiliar as to evoke panic or chaos.

Growth and Healing

In reviewing the territory covered by the term surrender, a subtext is revealed. The longing for surrender seems to emerge as a special detail in a more inclusive picture: growth and the restitution of impeded growth, healing. The literature abounds with papers and discussions of resistance; yet how little we study the vagaries of the force that is on the side of psychic healing, the impulse to grow, to surrender, to let-go. If this paper has said anything, it is that the pain and suffering of the masochist (and less obviously the sadist, at least in some instances) may well be the excuse the caretaker self has devised to get the true self to where it has a chance of being found, a signal that something deep inside is rent, a tear in the self, that unbeknown to its bearer, seeks healing, and that the masochistic patterns, especially if a certain satisfaction and pleasure accrues, are really expressions of the patient's efforts at self-cure. Masud Khan (1970, p. 97) has said, "very few illnesses in a person are difficult to handle and cure. What however, is most difficult to resolve and cure is the patient's practice of self-cure." Chasseguet-Smirgel (1983)
goes even further. In her explorations of the meaning of perversions she writes, "I consider that perversion is one of the essential ways and means [a person] applies in order to push forward the frontiers of what is possible and to unsettle reality. I see perversion not just as disorders of the sexual nature affecting a relatively small number of people [but] as a dimension of the human psyche in general, a temptation in the mind common to us all." The underlying theme, as Menaker (1969) suggests, is about growth, the healing and expansion of the self. She asks: "Will the patient choose it or refuse it?" Will he or she let us into the living kernel from which true growth is possible—and are we up to the challenge?

Let us not overlook the role of masochism and surrender in being a member of our profession. What other occupation requires of its practitioners that they be the objects of people's excoriations, threats and rejections, or be subjected to tantalizing offerings that plead "touch me," yet may not be touched? What other occupation has built into it the frustration of feeling helpless, stupid and lost as a necessary part of the work? And what other occupation puts its practitioners in the position of being an onlooker or midwife to the fulfillment of others' destinies. It is difficult to find a type of existence, other than that of the psychoanalyst, who fits this job description. In a sense it is the portrait of a masochist. Yet I suspect that a deep underlying motive in some analysts at least, is again that of surrender, and their own personal growth. It may be acceptably couched in masochistic garb or denied by narcissistic and/or sadistic exploitation. When the yearning for surrender is, or begins to be, realized by the analyst, the work is immensely fulfilling and the analyst grows with his patients.

Michael Polanyi (1958), the physical-chemist who turned his brilliance to sweeping inquiries into how the scientist works and to the psychology of thought, wrote: "We owe our mental existence predominantly to works of art, morality, religious worship, scientific theory and other articulate systems which we accept as our dwelling place and as the soil of our mental development. Objectivism has totally falsified our conception of truth, by exalting what we can know and prove, while covering up with ambiguous utterances all that we know and cannot prove, even though the latter knowledge underlies, and must ultimately set its seal to, all that we can prove" (quoted in Brenman-Gibson, (1976)). Some of the ideas addressed in this paper are at the level of hunches, and demand the follow-up of intellectual rigor as well as careful observation in our clinical work to see whether they stand the test of careful scrutiny. Also, in stressing the complexity of the matters at hand, it is important to remind ourselves that in the flush of putting forth one set of ideas, many other complicating considerations have been put aside and remain to be integrated.

Overview

As used in this paper, surrender, implies not defeat but a quality of liberation and "letting-go." I have explored the thesis that at least in some instances masochism is the result of a distortion or perversion of a deep longing for surrender, a yearning to be known, recognized, "penetrated," and often represents the miscarriage of a wish to dismantle false self. Similarly, some instances of sadism are traceable to the obverse of this phenomenon: a failure in the consummation of a more active "penetrative" type of surrender as in object usage. Successful transition from object relating to object usage involves an act of surrender and risk-taking on the part of the infant (or later, patient), as well as a degree of surrender on the part of the facilitating caretaker, or later, analyst. To round out the conception of surrender I have touched on related issues such as creativity and the apperception of disorganizing meaning.

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