THE UNIVERSITY AS A (POTENTIALLY) FACILITATING ENVIRONMENT

Abstract: In this article, I attempt to illuminate points of similarity between the process of “working through” in psychological treatment, and the ordinary day-to-day developmental potential of college life, suggesting that when students can be helped to make optimal use of the college interpersonal milieu, brief, analytically informed psychotherapy can work in concert with the average, expectable experimentation of late adolescence to facilitate growth and maturation.

Keywords: adolescence, adulthood, college students, identity, individuation, working through

Psychoanalytic work, as we all “know,” is lengthy: in fact, very lengthy—5.7 years on average in the United States (Doidge et al., 2002). However, college mental health treatment as it is practiced on our nation’s campuses is very brief, comprising on average 5.5 sessions (Rando & Barr, 2009), or a fraction of the time typically required for psychoanalysis. Given this stark contrast, it may reasonably be asked whether psychoanalysis is relevant to college mental health practice—that is, to the treatment of late adolescents and young adults in the college health centers that provide the only mental health care accessible to many students. Certainly, psychoanalysis, and even psychoanalytic psychotherapy—both of which require intensive, ongoing immersion—are limited in their applicability as treatment modalities in most university counseling services. Current trends in university mental health care are consistent with this view. For example, in a recent national survey (Gallagher, 2010), 71% of college counseling center respondents described their treatments as short term. However, when psychoanalysis is understood as a way of thinking about development and the capacity for growth and change (as I have sought to demonstrate elsewhere; see Eichler [2006]), it has much to offer for creatively shaping efficacious short-term counseling interventions and for addressing clinical dilemmas commonly encountered in college mental health practice.
Loewald (1960) characterized psychoanalysis as an intervention “contingent on the relationship with a new object, the analyst” that is “designed to set ego-development in motion, be it from a point of relative arrest, or to promote what we conceive of as a healthier direction and/or comprehensiveness of such development” (p. 17). Conceptualizing college mental health practice in terms of reviving or fortifying growth potential seems especially fitting, inasmuch as our patients are students who are expected to begin to emerge as adults. That is, they are expected to function more autonomously, to enter into more mature intimate relationships with friends and partners, to assume fuller responsibility for their actions, and to progress toward consolidating personal values and career objectives. In many instances, they are living apart from their parents for the first time and must not only make far-reaching life choices, but also rise to new academic heights; feed, clothe and otherwise care for themselves; apportion time between work, pleasure, and sleep; and resist negative influences and temptations, all without the close supervision and support of their families. When parents, peers, or mentors are inaccessible or students are unable to make sufficient use of them, the college counselor may help fill the breach.

Many students seeking our assistance are at a developmental impasse. They are unable, due to various combinations of intrapsychic and environmental forces, to experiment adequately with the new skills, ideas, and modes of relating and operating within society and the world at large that are vital to making the transition to adulthood. Drawing upon the theoretical foundation of psychoanalysis, albeit often with significant modifications to technique, it may be possible to reawaken dormant developmental potential “at those moments of transition or stress when students are tempted to retreat from the uncertainties and strains of the passage into adulthood” (Eichler, 2006, p. 25). An objective of college counseling with these students is to better position them “to invite and get more positive responses from family members and others in the environment, or at least, to end some of the dreadful interpersonal stalemates that played a part in their becoming psychotherapy patients in the first place” (Schafer, 1986, p. 156). Eliciting these more positive responses may, in turn, also prove therapeutic. In other words, I suggest that psychoanalytically informed college counseling can help equip many students who are experiencing acute subjective distress, adjustment difficulties, relationship problems, or even more chronic symptoms of dysphoria, self-consciousness, or guilt to remain engaged with their interpersonal
world. This, in turn may enable such students to capitalize on the developmental opportunities intrinsic to late adolescence generally, and to the college environment specifically. Brief counseling of this kind, however, is not appropriate for all students. For example, clinical experience and research suggest that students with multiple or chronic mental disorders or with serious character pathology typically require longer courses of treatment (e.g., Kopta, Howard, Lowry, & Beutler, 1994; Perry, Banon, & Ianni, 1999) than are ordinarily available in college mental health centers. Other conditions, such as drug dependence or severe eating disorders, are usually best treated in specialized programs.

To further articulate the ways in which the developmental opportunities intrinsic to therapy and college life may potentiate one another, I turn to a necessarily condensed and highly selective outline of certain aspects of psychosocial maturation during the college years. In doing so, I seek to illuminate the developmental trajectory college counselors may help keep on course by capitalizing on the potentially facilitating interpersonal environment of university life.

College as a Psychosocial Moratorium: Role Experimentation and the Transition to Adulthood

The college years are intended as ones of growth and change. At the very least, our highly technological society depends on transmitting the increasingly specialized skills ordinarily learned in college or beyond (e.g., graduate or professional school). These skills are most obviously academic in nature, but also ideally include skills in negotiating the complex social landscape of contemporary life, acquired not only in the classroom but also from living at close quarters with people with varying temperaments and from diverse backgrounds. University life provides a “truly extraordinary opportunity to observe one’s fellows, to hear about people in various parts of the world, to discuss what has been presented and observed, to find out, on this basis, what in [one’s] past experience is inadequately grasped and what is a natural springboard to grasping the new” (Sullivan, 1953, p. 299). Among other things, the college years may, at their best, provide an opportunity to expand the relatively narrow limits of personal experience and uncover and modify idiosyncratic social misperceptions and expectations.

In an implicit acknowledgement of the importance—both for the individual and for the culture as a whole—of a relatively unfettered period of
all kinds of learning, university students are effectively accorded a “psy-
chosocial moratorium” (Erikson, 1956) during which society sanctions a
temporary deferment of adult levels of commitment and responsibility in
order to experiment with future occupational, social, and relational roles,
and to nurture an emerging personal ideology. The willingness to test the
boundaries of the self—as reflected in actions as prosaic as trying out for
the debate society or as revolutionary as taking possession of previously
unrecognized or disowned sexual feelings—is essential in “the struggle
for identity, the struggle to feel real, the struggle not to fit into an adult-
assigned role” (Winnicott, 1984, p. 152), as well as for investigating the
many ways one can be in the world that are reasonably true to some in-
effable feeling of “me.” To adopt an adult stance precociously without
this sort of lived experimentation is to pattern one’s identity on largely
unmetabolized introjections or on stereotypical perceptions of adult-
hood, typically emphasizing self-sufficiency and achievement at the ex-
 pense of intimacy and connection; it is, at best, to follow a life path
without passion, self-reflection, or conviction, and, at worst, to adopt the
trappings of adulthood without its substance, leaving one immature at
the core and thus vulnerable when contending with life changes or losses
(Shulman, Blatt, & Feldman, 2006).

To venture into the uncharted territory of adolescence and, eventually,
adulthood requires some faith that the interpersonal world will receive
one’s overtures benignly. It also requires the audacity to imagine oneself
succeeding at endeavors of great importance that one has never before
attempted, which is perhaps why teenagers often appear regressed and
narcissistic to adults. Only by falling back on elements of infantile om-
nipotent fantasy may they summon the courage necessary to forego the
familiar adaptations and self-conceptualizations of childhood and open
themselves to hitherto unexplored, ill-formed, disclaimed, or undiscover-
ed possibilities. Thus, the free exercise of what Pumphian-Mindlin (1969)
termed “omnipotentiality”—a state of being characterized by contempt
for the limits imposed by the established order and a sense of boundless
capacity and of near-invincibility—“is a necessary and salutary occur-
rence in youth” (p. 225). Adolescents do not become adults through
quiet contemplation, thought experiments, or fantasized action alone,
but rather through concrete trial activity. It is only through lived experi-
ence, through putting ways of being, feeling, relating, and constructing
experience to the test in the crucible of social and intimate relationships,
that aspirational visions of a future adult self and the reality of personal
capacities and limitations can be brought into some sort of alignment. Quite simply, "... this period of life is one which must be lived" (Winnicott, 1984, p. 145; emphasis added).

The role experimentation of adolescence may be understood as an iterative exchange between the individual and society whereby adolescents uncover and audition various aspects of self-experience that may then be integrated, or at least "softly-assembled" (Harris, 1996) over time, in line with the responses that are elicited. Much as Winnicott (1971) suggested that babies need to find themselves in the mirror of their caregivers’ attuned gaze, college students need to see themselves in the mirror of society as emerging adults with adult bodies, adult sexuality, and adult capacities for love and work; as adults who can care for themselves and for others; as future wage-earners, partners, and perhaps parents. Youth, Erikson (1956) wrote,

through free role experimentation may find a niche in some section of his society, a niche which is firmly defined and yet seems to be uniquely made for him. In finding it the young adult gains an assured sense of inner continuity and social sameness which will bridge what he was as a child and what he is about to become, and will reconcile his conception of himself and his community’s recognition of him ... it is of great relevance to the young individual’s identity formation that he be responded to, and be given function and status as a person whose gradual growth and transformation make sense to those who begin to make sense to him. (pp. 66–67; emphases in original)

In his seminal early work, Erikson (1956) seems to suggest that successful “identity consolidation” eventuates in more or less perfect harmony between how one is perceived by one’s social surroundings and one’s internal, ineffable experience of being. However, as Lichtenstein (1963) observed, the social self (i.e., the way in which one is perceived) is an objectified self: one is a son, a daughter, a “good guy,” a “daredevil,” “a campus hottie,” and so forth. However, self-objectification is incompatible with a purely lived or existential experience of identity. When one thinks about oneself as a “self,” one ceases dwelling completely in one’s own experience, and interrupts the ongoing subjective awareness that presumably has roots in the earliest proprioceptive and mother-infant experiences (Bach, 1985). In other words, one begins to view oneself from outside. Although the tension between existential and social experiences
of self last throughout one’s life, it may take on special poignancy during
the college years when the social premium placed on individuation and
autonomy is at a peak. Inasmuch as self-reflection necessarily entails
adopting an “outside” perspective, students frequently lament an inability
to decide if their choices derive from something deeply personal or are
“contaminated” by conformity to social or parental expectations.

Likewise, at least from the postmodern perspective that has come to
permeate much of current psychoanalytic thinking, the notion of “con-
solidating” a social identity requires qualification. For example, Schafer
(1973) cautioned against reifying concepts of “self” and “identity,” which,
he noted, are not contents, structures, or entities, but ways in which
people think about and experience themselves. As such, self and identity
are subject to change with shifts in mood or life circumstance. Thus,
Schafer argued that complete constancy of identity is impossible. I sug-
gest that this is especially salient insofar as self-representations are co-
constructed in relation to the social surround. This is most apparent in
childhood when, for example, a toddler experiences her- or himself as a
“good” girl or boy in the afterglow of parents’ admiration, but as “bad” in
the face of parents’ angry condemnation. “Goodness” and “badness” in
these instances are not only feeling states, they are also part of the child’s
identity at a given moment, subject to change at other moments. Al-
though the experience of self may be less labile later in life, it is never
entirely independent of how one is received by others. At any stage in
life, for instance, one feels like a somewhat different person when one’s
romantic overtures are lovingly reciprocated than when they are spurned.
Nevertheless, at the center of the college student’s inner experience is a
quest to achieve what Bromberg (1996) characterizes as the “adaptive il-
lation” of a unitary, cohesive self that imposes order on potential chaos
so that a “person is only dimly or momentarily aware of the existence of
individual self-states and their respective realities, because each func-
tions as part of a healthy illusion of cohesive personal identity—an over-
arching cognitive and experiential state felt as ‘me’” (p. 514). The power
and importance of this “illusion” should not be underestimated. In the
best case, as Mitchell (1993) has suggested, fleeting and varied self-expe-
riences seamlessly blend together, like the individual frames of a movie,
to create the impression of continuity that in turn “creates an experience
that has a powerful subjective richness of its own, creating a larger ‘mov-
ing’ picture, very different from (and much more than) the simple sum of
the discrete pictures” (p. 115).
It is worth noting that Erikson (1956) insists that adolescents need to make sense specifically to those “who begin to make sense to them” (p. 67; emphasis added). The phrase calls to mind Benjamin’s (1990) argument that in order to experience fully one’s subjectivity in the presence of another, one must recognize the other as a subject, i.e., recognition must be mutual. As Erikson gives primacy to identity consolidation in his description of late adolescence, he views the defining task of the young adult years as the maturation of the capacity for intimate extrafamilial love relationships. In turn, he regards mutuality as a cornerstone of intimacy, contrasting mutuality with using partners, as they might have been used earlier in adolescence, for “mutual narcissistic mirroring” (Erikson, 1956, p. 79). Thus, as Benjamin observed, real love and connection come at a cost, requiring that one be able to recognize the other as subject and not merely object, so that one experiences the other outside the sphere of one’s mental omnipotence, with the loss of the illusion of control and of the absolute desire to assert the self that that implies. Although this process starts early in life, my observations align with those of Erikson (1963) and Gilligan (1982) that it is ordinarily at the threshold of adulthood, when all goes well, that a new level of mutuality may be reached.

In reworking Erikson’s developmental lines to account for female development, Gilligan (1982, p. 164) argued that for young men and women alike, reconciling the “conflict between integrity and care” is central to the transition to adulthood. Attaining adult levels of intimacy requires tempering individual desire with empathy and concern for others, but it also requires doing so without disclaiming one’s desires in order to avoid interpersonal conflict and sustain attachments. The tension between the wish to assert the supremacy of the self and to truly connect with others is, of course, never fully resolved but, ideally, with the passage to adulthood a greater capacity to hold these polarities of desire simultaneously is realized.

Just as in love relationships, where omnipotent, narcissistic strivings are ideally mitigated by the desire for a connection with and commitment to the other, experimentation during the college years is at once expansive and limiting, simultaneously giving expression to fantasy and probing its boundaries. The transition to adulthood is marked, among other things, by an increasing appreciation that to do anything one cannot do everything, and to be someone, one cannot be everyone. If, in early adolescence, it is sometimes difficult to adhere to one course of action because to do so is to restrict possibilities prematurely (Pumpian-Mindlin,
1969), then the cultural expectation is that the socially sanctioned experimentation of the college years will culminate in a commitment to at least the beginnings of a provisional life plan. This is not to say that commitments may not change over time. Indeed, midlife career changes, geographic relocations, divorce, remarriage, childbearing, and adoption later in life, once considered symbols of failure, are now commonplace (Noam, 1999). However, rethinking and reworking commitments over time is different than shunning commitments altogether, "in favor of maintaining a state of expectant, if futile, hopefulness for a perfect future" (Eichler, 2006, p. 67). The final common pathway of a host of intrapsychic dilemmas, among them narcissistic vulnerabilities of all kinds, is a lack of resolve in love and work: passionate absorption in a field of study or in a career rapidly yields to boredom; infatuations are intense, but fleeting; and the course of life is punctuated by one "new beginning" after another, rarely brought to fruition.

The Succession of the Generations

Intrapsychic factors alone, however, are not always sufficient to account for the developmental stasis in which many of our student-patients find themselves mired. Adolescents rely on their community for validation to sustain their development. In early adolescence, the approval of peers and later, of romantic partners, is generally sought above all else, but the need for affirmation by parents and/or parental surrogates also persists throughout the adolescent years. To endorse their passage into womanhood and manhood, young people in college especially look to adults in authority. After all, at both a practical and symbolic level, it is one's professors, advisors, coaches, and other adult experts who are the ultimate arbiters of one's abilities, as well as the critical gatekeepers in determining one's concrete future prospects. However, just as adolescents are typically ambivalent about becoming adults (because doing so requires, among other things, surrendering the illusion of omnipotentiality, not to mention separating from, or at least reorganizing, relationships with parents), adults are likewise typically ambivalent about "letting" adolescents grow up. On the one hand, raising children to adulthood (or, for that matter, mentoring students or advisees) may be a source of fulfillment, an opportunity to exhibit and pass on accumulated wisdom and to live on through the accomplishments of offspring or protégés. On the other hand, the growing confidence, competence, and sexuality of the younger generation typically elicits a host of other less altruistic feelings;
the ascension of the younger generation may be a potentially bitter reminder of the parental generation’s mortality and, more immediately, of the fact that the power and authority of parental figures may soon be challenged and eclipsed, and their sexuality diminished. Jacques (1965) observed that in midlife the inevitability of death becomes increasingly personal and “the maturing of [one’s] children into adults, contributes strongly to the sense of ageing—the sense that it is one’s own turn next to grow old and die” (p. 510). Loewald (1979) draws an even more emphatic link between mortality and one’s children coming of age, insisting that as children assume increasing authority over their own lives they “do kill something vital in [their parents]—not all in one blow and not in all respects, but contributing to their dying” (p. 764). When children no longer rely on their parents to nourish, provide for, and protect them, they “murder” that part of their parents that resides in exercising these parental functions. To a lesser extent, a similar process transpires when students transcend the need for professors or advisors or, for that matter, when patients no longer require the assistance of their therapists.

Thus, to offer one’s blessing to the next generation is no easy thing, for it is inextricably entwined with coming to grips with the inexorability of decline and mortality. Yet, this is precisely what the rising generation requires. It is not enough for the parental generation to submit to the inevitable. For example, when parents succumb to depressed resignation at the thought of their children going off to or graduating from college, children may be left to shoulder a tremendous burden of guilt, which in some instances may lead them to regress, to remain in one way or another dependent, or even to suffer a “breakdown,” necessitating a return home from school in an attempt (albeit unconsciously) to join parents in denying the passage of time and all that this implies about the parents’ loss of authority, status, and vigor. What children need from parents and parental surrogates, therefore, is not passive surrender to the inevitable, but rather “an actively loving gesture repeated time and again in which one gives over one’s place in the present generation to take one’s place sadly and proudly among those in the process of becoming ancestors” (Ogden, 2006, p. 657).

Ideally, parents and other important adults are able to pass the torch to the next generation with grace and generosity, motivated perhaps by love, and perhaps by a developmental requirement of their own, the need for what Erikson (1980) termed “generativity.” By this, he referred to the importance of “new beings as well as new products and new ideas . . . as indispensable for the renewal of the adult generation’s own life as
it is for that of the next generation” (p. 214). In identifying with and nurturing the next generation of adults, there is the possibility of vitalizing creativity and procreativity, a sense of connectedness with and faith in the future, which provides a potential counterweight to envy and loss.

Given the ambivalence with which the parental generation welcomes a rising generation into adult society, it is perhaps not surprising to discover that a wide range of rites of initiation at once celebrate adolescents’ coming of age, while concurrently inflicting hardships and trials. One function of such practices may be to subdue the younger generation and compel identification with the traditions of the established order (Arlow, 1951; Muensterberger, 1961), thereby indirectly perpetuating the authority of the older generation. On college campuses, for example, echoes of initiation rites may crop up in courses such as Organic Chemistry, which is notorious for thinning out the ranks of hopeful premedical students, or on the athletic field in ritualized hazing of new team members. In the worst case, parents or others in power may so resent the next generation’s claims upon the future that they not only refuse to affirm, but actively diminish the young people who look to them for support and validation.

The response of an adult to a particular student or group of students is likely to be colored by the convergence of at least three separate but interrelated factors: the quality of the relationship; firmly held, crystallized, stereotypical, and often contradictory cultural beliefs about adolescence; and “transferential” reactions predicated upon the adult’s particular conflicts, anxieties, projections, fantasies, aspirations, and past experiences (Anthony, 1970). When the adult struggles with midlife concerns or long-standing conflicts, or has had particularly unsatisfying experiences in adolescence, the capacity to “recognize” the subjectivity of the adolescent may be constrained, compromising the essential work of reflecting and affirming the adolescent’s unfolding adult self-image.

College students, for their part, having never before been college students, much less adults, may look to received images of late adolescence for guidance, and hence are prone to posturing and mimicking how they think college students are expected to behave. The persona adopted by college students may include hypersexual, provocatively antiauthoritarian, preternaturally mature, brooding, exquisitely sensitive, and withdrawn. Stereotypes function

\[\ldots\] as mirrors held up to the adolescent by society reflecting an image of himself that the adolescent gradually comes to regard as authentic and ac-
cording to which he shapes his behavior. In this way, he completes the circle of expectation. The adult is convinced of the validity of his stereotypes since the predicted behavior does in fact occur; the adolescent is convinced that he is simply doing what everyone is expecting him to do. (Anthony, 1970, p. 309)

Thus, unique developmental opportunities for self-discovery “can be lost in the press to satisfy visions of adolescence that are to too a great an extent tied to their origins in others’ fantasies” (Galazter-Levy, 2002, p. 67).

The detrimental effects of stereotyping may go beyond the internalization of negative self-images. The ongoing, here-and-now impact of going unrecognized, of being reduced to caricature in the eyes of others, should not be discounted. For example, Steele (1997) and his collaborators documented the adverse effects of what he termed a “stereotype threat” against the academic performance of African-American college students as well as the performance of women enrolled in advanced university mathematics classes. Steele’s data suggest that the threat of inadvertently confirming—by poor performance—a negative stereotype (e.g., “women are not good at math”) in a domain in which one is invested (e.g., academic achievement), may generate anxiety that impedes performance, or, worse, may lead to a disidentification with that domain. Although anxiety may be lessened when effort and investment are withdrawn defensively from so critical an undertaking as higher education, so too are future prospects—and dramatically so. Happily, there is a more hopeful side to this equation: the realization that one’s life narrative is not the immutable and inevitable consequence of constitutional, temperamental, or environmental factors (however important these factors may be) but rather is partially a social construction “brings with it the understanding that narrative could be other than it is” (Galazter-Levy, 2002, pp. 61–62). This insight may, in turn, revitalize one’s receptivity to developmental possibilities. As I previously suggested, this is one useful way of formulating the goal and praxis of college counseling with a significant subset of students who have arrived at a developmental impasse.

Changing the Narrative

The understanding that the narrative could be “other than it is” is often hard-won. People adhere to even devastating life narratives because they
fulfill, however painfully and imperfectly, one vital need or another, among them the need to preserve early connections to significant others, to maintain some sense of inner cohesiveness, and to minimize guilt and anxiety. For example, it is not unusual to encounter patients who persist in conceiving of themselves as hopelessly undesirable. Consequently, they pass their days in isolation and loneliness rather than risk the rejection and resulting inner disorganization they have come to expect based on past experiences (Muslin, 1986). Alternatively, thinking back to Steele’s research, academically capable African-American students who disown their natural and authentic interest in scholastic achievement may do so in order to manage the stress of chronic racial stereotyping, thus freeing themselves from the need to disprove the stereotype by outperforming time and time again, in every new setting in which they find themselves. Steele (1997) has suggested that such a need can seem “Sisyphean, everlastingly recurrent” (p. 618). Unable to find consistent validation of their intellect and scholarship in a culture suffused with unconscious racist stereotypes, students who encounter this dilemma presumably remake themselves “in others’ eyes” (Galazter-Levy, 2002, p. 43), reducing dissonance, paradoxically preserving self-esteem, and opening up the possibility of alternative sources of validation from members of the stereotype-threatened group for whom an anti-intellectual orientation may even become a group norm (Steele, 1999).

Although visions of the self at least partially arise in an interpersonal context, there may be potent intrapsychic reasons for maintaining those visions. From this perspective, therapy with college students includes uncovering and working through their motivations for preserving the status quo. In addition to the interpretation of intrapsychic conflict, contemporary Relational theories emphasize that growth also requires an experiential interpersonal foundation for abandoning the security of the familiar; if sometimes deeply unsatisfying, accommodations one has orchestrated to manage life’s hardships. Treatment ideally should offer a sense, through the collaborative exploration of new relational possibilities, of “what is worked toward . . . rather than only what must be given up and renounced” (Aron, 1991, p. 82). Returning to Loewald’s (1960) highly influential (Fogel, 1991) conceptualization of therapeutic action,
jects.". The essence of such new object-relationships is the opportunity they offer for rediscovery of the early paths of the development of object-relations, leading to a new way of relating to objects as well as of being and relating to oneself. (p. 18)

Loewald emphasizes that patients do not simply identify with analysts, nor, for that matter, do children simply identify with parents. Rather, patients internalize dyadic interactions with their analysts. Aron (1991, 2006) demonstrated the importance of this distinction. For example, if it is dyadic interactions that are internalized, an abused child may grow into an adult who relates to others as abused or abusive, sadistic or masochistic, victimized or victimizing. Although the individual may be able to assume at different times either side of these polarities, she or he may not be able, as Aron puts it, to exit the seesaw dynamic and relate in ways that do not fruitlessly repeat one or the other of these positions.

When the representational world (Sandler & Rosenblatt, 1962) is constructed along narrowly dichotomized lines, it severely curtails opportunities for college students to engage fruitfully in the expansive role experimentation I described earlier. If one's relational vocabulary is rigidly and narrowly fixed, one is less likely to elicit new responses from the social surround. Even if new responses are elicited, they are likely to be reinterpreted in line with old categories, insistently wedged into the Procrustean bed of stale, limiting, and preconceived constructions of experience. Thus, activity of the analyst in reawakening dormant developmental potential may necessarily include interpreting transference distortions but to this Loewald (1960) adds:

... as in sculpture, we must have, if only in rudiments, an image of that which needs to be brought into its own. The patient, by revealing himself to the analyst, provides rudiments of such an image through all the distortions—an image which the analyst has to focus in his mind, thus holding it in safe keeping for the patient to whom it is mainly lost. It is this tenuous reciprocal tie which represents the germ of a new object-relationship. (p. 18)

The vision of the patient, therefore, is co-constructed by patient and analyst. The analyst creates the requisite atmosphere of holding and safety, and, in addition, contributes subjectivity, experience, and training whereas the patient contributes a “privileged insider view of her own experience” (Chodorow, 2004, p. 220). Patients reveal something essential to their
therapists, who, in turn, help bring that something into focus, sharpening
the image by contributing something of themselves, much as parents
contribute to their children's construction of a representational world.
The parent, Loewald (1960) writes, is

... ahead in his vision of the child's future. ... This vision, informed by
the parent's own experience and knowledge of growth and future, is, ide-
ally, a more articulate and more integrated version of the core of being
which the child presents to the parent. This 'more' that the parent sees and
knows, he mediates to the child so that the child in identification with it
can grow. The child, by internalizing aspects of the parent, also internalizes
the parent's image of the child... (p. 20)

Working Through in Daily Life

The reader will recognize that Loewald's (1960) description of therapeu-
tic activity resembles Erikson's (1956) description, outlined above, of the
iterative process by which youthful expressions of self are articulated and
elaborated over time in the mirror of society. In the most benign of envi-
ronmental circumstances, society does not respond to youth passively,
but actively reflects an enhanced vision that potentially bridges past and
future that endorses and elaborates (and often moderates) the adoles-
cent's tentative efforts to inhabit a social niche, which anticipates—as
parents and analysts ideally anticipate—a more fully realized, newly
adult person. Thus, the dialectic between youth and society helps college
students find a pathway into adulthood that, although requiring accom-
modations, also feels true to an ineffable feeling of "me."

My intention in noting points of similarity relating psychological treat-
ment to the normative give and take between youth and society is to in-
vite the reader to consider that the college years may represent a unique
sociocultural moment during which the interpersonal environment offers
especially rich developmental opportunities that complement the devel-
opmental opportunities afforded by psychotherapy. One need not sub-
scribe to an essentialist view of adolescence or even developmental
models to entertain this possibility. Whether or not there is anything spe-
cific to the biology or other intrinsic characteristics of adolescence that
prompts intrapsychic reorganization, it is incontrovertibly true that there
are specific sociocultural expectations about and during the college years,
at least in contemporary American culture, which creates a need for the
psychosocial moratorium Erikson (1956) described. Like therapy, college life offers license to experiment as well as a partial suspension of ordinary social constraints.

The college years provide access to a cohort of peers who, to a degree unrivaled during any other time in life, respond to a highly uniform set of sociocultural imperatives. Members of such cohorts are primed to share in one another’s crucial relational dramas, and even to analyze and deconstruct these dramas into the early morning hours, if need be. Here, I am thinking especially of prospective romantic partners who want, expect, and need to discover adult intimacy together, a form of intimacy that may be founded upon, but requires a reworking of, the relational repertoire of childhood. Students are often conscious that they are striving to pattern relationships, especially love relationships, on a new basis. Talk of “something real,” “not just hooking up” and “taking it to the next level” abounds; the conscious mutual effort to reach for something new, relatively free at this stage of life from the pressure to make lasting commitments, promotes, in the best case, relational fluidity.

The dialogue, be it in word or deed, between students trying to work out relationships with important others invites a loose comparison to the mutual effort made by analyst and patient, emphasized by the intersubjective turn in psychoanalytic discourse, to achieve new relational positions and to overcome that which threatens, rather than enriches, connections. Mitchell (1988), for example, suggests that analyst and patient each discovers in him- or herself “a coactor in a passionate drama involving love and hate, sexuality and murder, intrusion and abandonment, victims and executioners” (p. 295). The therapeutic task becomes one of therapist and patient together finding some way of altering the script, playing new parts, and experiencing themselves and each other differently.

Therapy and the interpersonal world of college each invite play, or more precisely, play-acting, in which there is not only the opportunity to rework restrictive relational matrices, but also to moderate intrapsychic fantasy in conformity with the demands of reality. Play, Mahon (2004) has observed, bears much in common with “working through,” the element of treatment that contributes most to its lengthiness (Brenner, 1987). From Mahon’s perspective, in working through, patients use transfer-

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1 The shift from one metapsychological framework to another reflects my view that no single superordinate theory accounts for the complexity and variety of developmental experience nor meets the needs of all clinical exigencies. With all patients—but with college-aged
ence to hold a mirror up to their interior worlds just as children, when playing, use concrete objects to give substance to—and thereby make it easier to wrestle with—inner experience; transference objects and play-things alike are manipulated to give expression to fantasy, but also to probe the frontiers of reality, “as limitless thought and fancy wed themselves to the practical necessity of finite human action” (Mahon, 2004, p. 407). In the ideal, omnipotent infantile fantasy is not vanquished. On the contrary, it persists in creative tension with the reality principle, infusing reality with emotional vitality and substance. If, in Loewald’s account of therapeutic action, we find a resemblance to Erikson’s (1956) description of the mutual recognition of adolescent and society, in Mahon’s description of “working through” we find a process analogous to the indispensable activity by which adolescents, as they emerge as adults, in the best case subordinate omnipotentiality to commitment without the loss of meaning that depends upon “live communication between youthful dreams and fantasies and what we call actual, rational life” (Loewald, 1975, p. 296).

If interpersonal interactions akin to some of the experiential aspects of “working through” in the analytic setting can be realized in the course of college life outside the parameters of the treatment relationship, then the most fundamental limitation of college counseling, as it is practiced—its brevity—may be mitigated somewhat by leveraging this critical developmental moment to extend the work of psychotherapy. From this vantage point, a principal aim of college counseling is to revive, sustain, and amplify ordinary, expectable explorations of identity and intimacy in those students who have avoided or retreated from such exploration.

This is not to suggest that therapeutic work does not extend, albeit to a lesser degree, outside of the consulting room at other times of life, as well. At any age, the work of psychotherapy and the work of living should be intimately entwined and complementary. For example, a phobia cannot be overcome unless the object of avoidance is actually con-
fronted and the attendant anxiety endured; a collapsing relationship cannot be repaired without actually engaging with one’s partner; anorexia will not yield to interpretation alone—one must actually eat. As Power (2000) wrote,

> When going well, a good analysis includes a great deal of practicing, rehearsing, and “trying on for size.” However . . . the step of carrying these responses over to nonanalytic situations remains. This carryover is necessary because no extratransference situation exactly mimics the transference one. . . . Although significant and necessary work can be accomplished on such problems within the analytic setting itself, the ultimate establishment of new responses requires practice and effort outside the analytic dyad, “closer to home.” (p. 510)

Notwithstanding the need to foster a unique set of conditions that promote safety and self-reflection, psychoanalysts must take care to ensure that therapeutic aims are not neglected in favor of an idealization of process (Bader, 1994), lest analysis become a sanctuary detached from life—a place where commitments can forever be deferred, personal limits and the limits imposed by mortality never engaged, a place of boundless potential but little actualization. For college students on the threshold of adulthood, painfully struggling with the recognition that the psychosocial moratorium is just that, there may be only too great a readiness to misuse treatment to sustain the illusion of omnipotentiality.

Both within and outside treatment, it is not uncommon for college students to experience a tremendous sense of urgency, even while behaving as if tomorrow will never come. Painfully conscious of their own immaturities, which are easily exaggerated by comparison to idealized visions of peers or of their age cohort in the abstract, many students feel they are falling behind in love, sex, work, and growing up. At the same time, the fear of testing limits, of surrendering the fantasy of limitless choice and possibility, turns them away from action and toward delay and procrastination. Some students, for instance, enroll in graduate or professional study, not because they have found their calling, but precisely because they have not, and are seeking in postgraduate work to extend the psychosocial moratorium of the college years (Eichler, 2006). Such a path is likely to disappoint or worse, however, inasmuch as the educational emphasis is now on specialization, on narrowing one’s focus, and, ultimately, on commitment. In extreme cases, overriding wishes
to remain unsettled are expressed in a frenetic succession of haphazard, quickly discarded new endeavors that, for all their appearance of enterprise, mask a dedication to directionlessness, and concomitant shame and dysphoria (Blos, 1979).

Given the unforgiving nature of the academic calendar, students’ relationship with time has obvious consequences for scholastic success. In a society in which a lack of a college diploma is a profound disadvantage, and in which only about 57% of students enrolled in four-year colleges graduate within six years (National Center for Educational Statistics, 2006), the pragmatic importance of attending to the clock, and conducting treatment in real time cannot be overstated. The brevity of college counseling and the therapeutic focus it necessitates (Groves, 1996) provide an advantage in compelling an attentiveness to the passage of time that otherwise might go unremarked. After all, it is not only youth who may wish to deny the relentless ticking of the clock, with its implications for mortality, therapists in midlife and beyond may have their own unconscious motives for colluding in the belief that there is plenty of time (Eichler & Schwartz, 2010).

Technical Considerations in College Counseling: Validation and Affirmation

My purpose in this article has been to describe an orientation to college counseling, rather than to prescribe specific techniques, which, in any event should emerge, from the unique interaction between the individual patient and therapist. I would like to conclude, however, by briefly highlighting two therapeutic elements that further illustrate concrete ways in which psychoanalytically informed college counseling may support the ongoing-ness of development in the world outside the consulting room.

The first of these elements is affirmation (or validation). As already discussed, an adverse interpersonal environment may compound or even eclipse the contribution of intrapsychic factors in engendering developmental stasis. In addition, the brief survey of midlife and adolescence presented above suggests how readily developmental trajectories at these phases of life can clash to the detriment of all concerned,² sometimes offering students a mirror that does not validate, but deforms and dimin-

²Given my topic, I have focused on how adults may thwart youth, but, of course, the reverse may also be true: at all stages of life there is a need for mutual recognition. For example, as the young suffer when denied validation, their elders suffer when “generative”
ishes. As much as we need to listen for and interpret behaviors that excite seemingly undesirable responses from others, and as much as we need to listen for and address the ways in which students may misperceive experience, we need to be equally attuned to actual failures on the part of the interpersonal world to provide what is needed for growth and health. Schechter (2007) has suggested that the role of validation is underappreciated in psychoanalysis, in part because analysts may be concerned about claiming excessive “objectivity.” However, one need not ascribe to the therapist a monopoly on objectivity to appreciate the power and legitimacy of the therapist’s affirmation: after all, “The crucial element in validation is the experience of . . . having been seen, understood, and accepted by an important other. This is the case even though the reality of that other is no more ‘objective’ than one’s own” (p. 120).

Acknowledging the possibility that there have been real failures on the part of significant others to recognize and affirm our student-patients is, in my experience, often a critical first step in helping to restore trust that has been tested by disappointment—trust required both to put oneself forward in the world and to make productive use of psychotherapy. It is equally important to introduce the notion that even if certain responses have been in some way provoked or invited, they nevertheless may constitute bad faith: for example, the exploitation of students who are starved for connectedness, prone to idealization, and all too susceptible to sexual advances by admired adults who prey upon adolescent and young adult vulnerabilities. Students who are inclined to externalize the locus of their troubles are liable to experience the therapist’s silence on the allocation of responsibility for emotional injuries to outside sources as corroboration that the mirror of society, as personified by the therapist, is accusatory, corrupt, biased, or otherwise untrue, and is therefore best avoided. On the other hand, students prone to internalizing the locus of their difficulties are at risk for interpreting the therapist’s silence in this context as tacit confirmation of fantasies or fears of blameworthiness or deficiency, which in turn may aggravate reluctance to test themselves, as they must, in the crucible of college life.

Erikson (1962) made a similar point in his discussion of Freud’s (1953) analysis of “Dora,” who, it will be recalled, was college age during her brief treatment. In his dogged pursuit of the vicissitudes of the Oedipal impulses are rebuffed. How members of each generation treat one another has important consequences for how they are treated in kind.
feelings that Freud was convinced underlay Dora’s symptomatology, he refused her the affirmation of “historical actuality” she required in order to legitimize her experience of adult exploitation and betrayal. Dora was already severely handicapped by the lack of meaningful identities Victorian society offered young women of her intelligence. Therefore, before she could utilize insight into her own intrapsychic workings, she needed at the very least “to set straight the historical past” (Erikson, 1962, p. 460) in order to “preserve some sense of autonomy, to maintain some view of herself as other than the passive sexual plaything that the conspiring adults in her world sought to make of her” (Esman, 1998, p. 163).

College students differ as a group from the highly self-selected cohort of patients who seek psychoanalysis or even intensive psychodynamic therapy; few come to counseling centers initially wanting or anticipating a protracted, microscopic exploration of their relationship with their therapist. Many, however, come urgently seeking a compass, a voice of reality to offer guidance amid despair and confusion. If we do not meet students on their own ground, we may well find ourselves frequently alone in our offices. In this context, it is also worth noting the importance of cultural factors. The emphasis on process endemic to psychoanalysis is discordant not only with the developmental urgency of the college years, but also with the expectation of many students from non-Western cultures that help will take the form of authoritative advice (Sue & Sue, 2003). Thus, active listening may be experienced as passivity or disinterest; a nonjudgmental stance may be experienced as infuriatingly nondirective and unresponsive; a process-orientation may be experienced as solipsistic or irrelevant.

Affirming the experience of having been let down by the social surround can facilitate, rather than inhibit, the student’s capacity to hear and metabolize interpretation. Loewald (1960), in perhaps one of his most enduringly influential statements, asserted that buttressing development occurs in relation to the analyst as a new object. However, as much as we may fancy ourselves different from important others who have shaped patients’ lives, we are nonetheless readily recruited into repetitions of old relational patterns, readily transformed into new incarnations of old objects. Although this is unavoidable and even desirable insofar as it makes transference interpretation possible, as Greenberg (1986) observed, a balance needs to be struck between being seen by the patient as both an old and new object. For some patients—for example, those whose parents needed to distance themselves from their children’s aggressive or
erotic feelings—Greenberg argues that too reserved an analytic posture may convey the sense that the analyst also cannot bear these feelings. Thus, neutrality, rather than facilitating free association, compromises the conditions of safety that enable patients to share their fears, wishes, humiliations, and the like. For these patients, it may be vital to give voice to judgments about the apparently destructive or abusive people in their lives if psychotherapeutic work is to proceed. To this I would add that voicing such judgments might be a crucial counterpoint to the homophobia, racism, sexism, marginalization on the basis of religion or ethnicity, or any of the other corrosive social forces that may engender mistrust and disconnection.

None of the foregoing is to suggest that the therapist can, by her or his “goodness” alone, restore the faith needed to reengage with the world writ large. Aron (1991) has cautioned against portraying treatment as “the direct provision to the patient of the crucial experiences which they were deprived of” (p. 99), and against “arrogantly assuming that in some ill defined way the therapist is better than others in the patient’s life” (p. 101). To be clear, I am not suggesting that in a handful of college counseling visits, or, for that matter, in several years of psychoanalysis, one could compensate for affirmation missing in lived experience, current or past. On the contrary, I am suggesting that, especially in brief treatments, we need to encourage when we can, active recognition of, and receptivity to, potentially validating, transformative relational opportunities that might be found among peers, family members, mentors, professors, and other significant people to supplement what we can do in the consulting room. In affirming what has previously been disaffirmed, or at least in joining patients in questioning how true a mirror their world has been, I do not mean to suggest there must be a sweeping corrective emotional experience. Rather, I hope there might be found a germinal experience, an experience that unsettles disappointments before they ossify, that reawakens a modicum of hope or trust, an experience that emboldens the student to make tentative new overtures in life outside therapy, which in turn leads to other experiences that lead to other experiences still.

Further Technical Considerations: Therapeutic Flexibility

This bears on the second element I wish to emphasize about the practice of college counseling: fluidity. In the discussion that follows, I focus narrowly on the importance of fluidity in scheduling appointments. Al-
though perhaps a rather prosaic matter, it is one that—at a symbolic level—is suffused with meanings about control, compliance, need and independence, among others, and is useful as a proxy for inviting broader consideration of the therapist's flexibility and accommodation to both the developmental conditions of late adolescence and young adulthood, as well as to the real life limits of the college counseling setting.

Many students, as virtually any seasoned college mental-health professional can attest, will, when left to their own devices, drop in and out of treatment—out more often than in—at a remarkable rate and with remarkable unpredictability. It is commonplace for students to appear at the counseling center, unannounced, with no prior appointment, in an obvious state of extreme agitation or despair, and insist upon being seen then and there, only to indicate two or three weeks later that they are ready to terminate that very day (Eichler, 2006). When therapists express surprise at this sudden turnaround, it is equally common for students to dismiss out of hand the intense subjective distress that eventuated in an emergent appointment as something that happened long ago. Actually, these conversations about termination often never take place at all; students simply stop coming. A recent study found that more than 17% of students did not return after intake and that more than 40% were judged by their therapists to have terminated prematurely (Hatchett & Park, 2003). Of course, ambivalence about treatment is hardly exclusive to college students, but in late adolescence and young adulthood, ambivalence about relying on a therapist for help is often especially pronounced, in part because being identified as a “patient” is frequently anathema in light of age-specific preoccupations with identity, and in part because of the premium placed on independence during this time of life (Eichler, 2006).

Research (e.g., Arnett, 1997, 2003) has shown that the top criteria endorsed by young Americans as indicative of achieving adult status emphasize aspects of individualism, such as taking responsibility for one's actions and subscribing to beliefs and values independent of parents or other influences. Young people of color also give significant weight to criteria indicative of fulfilling family obligations (Arnett, 2003). Likewise, shedding adult dependencies has historically been viewed in the psychoanalytic literature as the sine qua non of the adolescent passage, nowhere more so perhaps than in the work of Peter Blos (1967). Blos viewed adolescence as a second phase in the process of separation-individuation (Mahler, Pine, & Bergman, 1975) in which the loosening of
infantile object ties to parents promotes further differentiation of self and object representations and ego maturation, and is a prerequisite to taking one’s place in the adult world. From this perspective, entering into a quasi-dependent therapeutic relationship is at crosscurrents with the normative thrust of development (Eichler, 2006). Yet students present at college counseling centers in great numbers (Rando & Barr, 2009), which serves to emphasize the other side of ambivalence: a desire for help, certainly, but a desire for connection as well.

The intimate relationship between separation and individuation has been called into question in recent years. The attachment literature in particular challenges the inextricability of this relationship, suggesting that the “central developmental thrust that Mahler was attempting to capture might be better thought of as an attachment-individuation process rather than a separation-individuation process” in that the infant seeks “to establish and preserve emotional ties to preferred caregivers at all costs, while simultaneously attempting to find a place within these relationships for his or her own goals and initiatives” (Lyons-Ruth, 1991, p. 10). Marohn (1998) and Doctors (2000), among others, have applied this thinking to adolescence, arguing that individuation in adolescence depends on secure attachments as a platform for developmental expansion; secure adolescents do not renounce ties to parents, so much as rework and make them more complex.

Adolescents, Loewald (1979) wrote, are driven by an “active urge for emancipation . . . [for] assuming or asserting responsibility and authority” (p. 757) that once belonged to the parents, but to achieve this end, they paradoxically require the recognition of parents or parent-surrogates. Thus, separation and attachment are arguably not mutually exclusive as engines of individuation, but are rather best understood as complementary: “In the very moment of realizing our own independent will, we are dependent on another to recognize it” (Benjamin, 1990, p. 39). Thought of this way, the individuation of the late adolescent years and beyond requires separation, not in the sense of relinquishing old objects ties, but in the sense of relinquishing old relational patterns—i.e., it requires reordering parent-child authority relations, a reassignment of authorship for the child’s life from parent to child so that in the end the “parents have contributed to the creation of a child who is capable of being and becoming unlike them” (Ogden, 2006, p. 660; emphasis in original).

Turning one last time to the implications for treatment, the ambivalence of college student patients is seen to have a normative quality:
“connection and separation form a tension, which requires the equal magnetism of both sides” (Benjamin, 1990, p. 26). It is an error to reflexively regard the ambivalent comings and goings of student patients (whether enacted in physical or psychological absence from treatment) as “resistance” to be overcome, although it may be this as well. Although some students unquestionably require the predictability and security of regularly scheduled appointments, in some cases, the therapist’s tolerance of their patients’ ambivalence may even usefully be given concrete expression in acceding to treatment “on demand.”3 As I have discussed elsewhere (Eichler, 2006), intermittent treatment of this kind allows for more ongoing care by distributing the limited number of sessions available to each student in most counseling centers over a much longer period of time, and accommodating to students’ simultaneous needs for connection and separation, providing a secure home base from which to explore and experiment, while providing tangible distance:

Long gaps in treatment do not necessarily imply gaps in the therapeutic relationship, which may be very much alive for students during their absences from treatment. Students may draw sustenance from their therapists’ constancy, their ongoing availability, the knowledge that they are there to be found again when needed. (Eichler, 2006, pp. 29–30)

Students may return to their therapists, as Mahler (Mahler et al., 1975) suggested toddlers return to their primary caregivers during their “love affair with the world” (Greenacre, 1957, p. 57) seeking reassurance that they can separate and individuate without destroying their object world, but also for affirmation, for the support and encouragement that comes of knowing that another can share in and appreciate one’s experience. This is not to suggest that brief college counseling, be it intermittent, continuous, or otherwise, is a substitute for the psychoanalysis or psychoanalytic psychotherapy some may ultimately require. It is to suggest, however, that in making the most of what is typically possible in university health settings, therapists often do well to conceptualize their work as integrated with the ongoing opportunities for developmental enrichment outside the consulting room in order to better position their pa-

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3 For more severely disturbed students intermittent treatment is generally contraindicated and may even “be akin to the enabling behavior that partners of alcoholics engage in, which allows the condition to continue and, over the long haul, worsen” (Gilbert, 1992, p. 697).
tients to negotiate the transition to adulthood, and to better meet the challenges and opportunities of life beyond college.

Recognizing that some of the treatment arrangements proposed here are unconventional, I conclude by noting that no less an authority than Winnicott (1980) saw virtue in treating some children “on demand,” arguing that “[i]t is possible for the treatment of a child actually to interfere with a very valuable thing which is the ability of the child’s home to tolerate and to cope with the child’s clinical states that indicate emotional strain and temporary holdups in emotional development, or even the fact of development itself” (p. 2). Likewise, I have argued that brief, sometimes intermittent psychotherapy, if offered judiciously and selectively to the right students, ensures that treatment does not function as a refuge from the painful affects associated with the trial and error of the passage into adulthood, but supports students in tolerating the frustration, disappointment, and anxiety inevitable in moving forward and supports them in staying engaged. Of course, it is not so much the facts of how appointments are scheduled that matters, but rather an analytic attitude—an attitude that is appreciative of developmental requirements, of cultural influences, of the difference between repetitive, self-destructive “acting out” and essential (if at times hair-raising) play-acting, and of the complementarity of therapy and lived experience—that makes all the difference.

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