HERR PROFESSOR AND HIS “GRAND VIZIR”:
THE FREUD/FERENCZI RELATIONSHIP IN ITS SOCIAL CONTEXT

Abstract. By taking a social psychological approach, this article seeks to offer an alternative perspective to the traditional psychoanalytic studies of Freud and Ferenczi’s close personal and professional relationship, and the rift that occurred in the early 1930s. It is suggested that the socially constructed, divergent roles that these two men fulfilled in the psychoanalysis movement deeply influenced the dynamics of their relationship. It is further proposed that the ever-present, conflicted political interdependence that characterized Freud’s and Ferenczi’s home countries (Austria and Hungary, respectively) may have affected them differently, and contributed to their divergent attitudes towards power and other issues relevant to the development of psychoanalytic theory and technique, as well as how they related to one another personally.

Keywords: Freud-Ferenczi relationship, history of psychoanalysis, sociopolitical context, cultural differences, mutuality, power

Introduction

IN THIS ARTICLE, I look at how Freud and Ferenczi’s personal and professional relationship evolved over time, which parallels to some degree—and therefore offers some insight into—the development of psychoanalysis itself. I widen the usual psychoanalytic lens through which their relationship is viewed and focus on the important influence of the social environment to which these two luminaries belonged. By all accounts, Freud and Ferenczi quickly became close personal and professional confidants and maintained an intense involvement with one another over several decades. In the early 1930s, a rift developed in the relationship and, although they never stopped interacting with one another and were clearly interested and involved in each other’s lives, they became more distant and explicitly more judgmental.

Most reports on the relationship between Freud and Ferenczi elevate them into intellectual heroes, and turn their conflicts into the precursors
of current major psychoanalytic divides. The publication of Ferenczi’s clinical diary (1988) and the Freud-Ferenczi correspondence (1993, 1996) has allowed for studies of their connection and conflict, revealing their struggles with interdependency, closeness, and independence. Most of these observations, falling along traditional psychoanalytic lines, focus on Freud and Ferenczi’s interpersonal dynamic, pointing out how their personalities, unique approaches to psychoanalytic technique and theory, personal and family histories, and various transferential expectations, attitudes, preoccupations, and neuroses affected the way they worked and the way their relationship unfolded over time.

Taking a somewhat different approach, I will introduce additional factors that are more social psychological in nature and that will widen the scope of our considerations. These factors include the sociocultural and political context in which the relationship was situated, which, in turn, organized the unique dynamics of their relationship. In other words, I intend to study how certain aspects of their social environment were elaborated in their inner worlds and how, to a considerable degree, these aspects structured and shaped the experiences they had with one another.

To start, among the factors are the particular roles (constructed by and for them) they were destined to play in the development of the psychoanalytic movement (Freud being the originator and Ferenczi being one of Freud’s followers). In turn, these roles influenced, to a great degree, the dynamics of their interpersonal interactions, their approach to psychoanalysis, and perhaps even the content of their theories. Another factor that I will consider is the difference in class—and ethnicity-based cultural background—between the two men, which contributed to their respective life experiences, values, and identities. In addition, the impact of the political milieu on their relationship, interwoven with the above-mentioned cultural differences, will be explored. I propose that the ever-present, conflicted political interdependence that characterized Freud’s and Ferenczi’s home countries (Austria and Hungary, respectively) may have affected each of them differently and may have contributed to their divergent attitudes towards power and other issues relevant to psychoanalysis, as well as how they related to one another personally. The paradoxical and complicated ways in which the personal and the professional, distance and closeness, and independence and mutual influence affected the Freud/Ferenczi relationship will be examined throughout the article.
Ferenczi and Freud’s Relationship: The Traditional Representation

When authors talk about the rift that occurred between Freud and Ferenczi, they emphasize three main psychological factors. These include incompatibilities in their personalities/neuroses, their theoretical disagreements, and their conflict about psychoanalytic technique. Most, I think, would agree that all these factors have something to do with the distance that developed between them, but the relative importance of each is debated (see Hoffer, 1990). I will now briefly highlight examples of how these types of studies have led to diverse viewpoints about the details and specifics of their dynamic.

**Personality and Neurosis**

When Jones (1955) and Gay (1988) write about the relationship between Freud and Ferenczi, they date the beginning of the rift to a trip to Sicily in 1910 and blame the tension on Ferenczi’s inordinate strivings for intimacy, which they consider to be the result of his unresolved conflict with his father. A newer version of this idea was developed by Nemes (1988), who suggests that Ferenczi’s regression to his adolescent loss of his father was a main contributor to the alienation. Aron (1998) creates a more balanced view by postulating that Ferenczi likely expressed more independence and wishes for dependence than Freud was willing to accept, and that neither one of them could be blamed exclusively for the difficulties in their relationship. As Aron points out, their personalities were simply different and, in certain ways, incompatible. Further, it is fair to say that neither one was more neurotic than the other. For example, when Ferenczi wanted to develop an uninhibited, fun, mutual, and close personal relationship with Freud, his wishes were infantilized. Freud, who wished to preserve his distance from Ferenczi, considered this natural and necessary in order to sustain his role as a father and analyst to him.

**Disagreements about Theory and Technique**

Another discourse focuses on the theoretical differences that developed between the two as the source of their conflict. Masson (1984), for example, attributes the rift to Ferenczi’s later conviction that real parental abuse did play a role in the development of neurosis, which Freud dismissed by treating it as a less “mature” version of his own earlier, discredited conceptualization of trauma. Another example is Balint’s (1979) for-
mulation: he suggests that Freud and Ferenczi encountered different forms of regression in their patients and so had difficulty seeing each other’s point of view. Consequently, Freud became overly cautious of malignant regression, whereas Ferenczi became overly optimistic about the potential of its benign forms. Moreover, Freud’s letter (1931/1963), in which he reprimands Ferenczi for his “kissing technique,” following Clara Thompson’s comment about her treatment with him (“I am allowed to kiss Papa Ferenczi, as often as I like” [Ferenczi, 1988, p. 28]) is well known. Indeed, throughout his career, Ferenczi actively experimented with psychoanalytic technique, and as Hoffer (2010) points out, the brunt of Freud’s negative reactions to Ferenczi’s writings was a result of condemning the “measures Ferenczi employed in the pursuit of reality” of the original trauma. Aron and Harris (2010), as well as Haynal (1989), write about Freud’s disapproval of Ferenczi’s unorthodox technique, which was designed to induce regression—and that Freud considered dangerous. Of course, the reverse is equally true and the disapproval was mutual: Ferenczi’s experimentation serves as a criticism to Freud’s insight-driven, intellectual version of psychoanalysis.

**Freud’s and Ferenczi’s Roles in the Development of Psychoanalysis**

One might ask: How did the personal, technical, and theoretical differences described above arise in light of the different roles Ferenczi and Freud played in the psychoanalytic movement?

When Ferenczi became involved in psychoanalysis, he entered into a complex unfolding social system that had been established by its founding father, its inventor. In this role, Freud’s pronouncements (usually under the guise of theoretical and technical edicts) defined psychoanalysis as a field—a movement—to be entered into, adhered to, and, if necessary, expelled from. This relegated all others to the role of followers, who then acquiesced, by virtue of Freud’s paternal role, to his definitions of practice and theory. In this way, in their thoughts and actions, Freud’s followers coconstructed the social phenomenon of psychoanalysis and preserved their own subordinated situation in it. The monumental amount of correspondence, not just between Freud and Ferenczi, but amongst all the members of the movement (the hub of this correspondence being Freud, of course), is a testament to the tireless effort that went into the construction of this system.

Freud spoke and wrote about the “scientific discovery” of psychoanal-
ysis. Framing it as such, psychoanalysis was defined as an independently existing entity, a public property that, in theory, could be accessible to everyone for further exploration. This inspired and motivated many others to become interested in a set of ideas (i.e., “Freud’s ideas”) and try to elaborate their own pathways to experiencing and understanding this “science.” But whom, and what, was considered a legitimate “psychoanalytic” contributor, or contribution, depended on many factors other than the content of the work. One had to be recognized as a member of the system, and one’s voice had to be given legitimacy by Freud himself. This might help explain how the work of some authors (e.g., Sabina Spielrein, Georg Groddeck, or even Josef Breuer) may not have been given the full recognition that their substantial contributions would warrant because they had not been given full “membership” in the social system. The development of “real” psychoanalysis could only be accessed by those who were part of the established system. Freud transformed a public discovery into a proprietary invention, which gave him “ownership” rights in his eyes and in the eyes of his contemporaries.

Even during his period as a full member of “psychoanalysis,” Ferenczi could never, by definition, be considered a full and equal partner to Freud by either one of them. This was not only due to intrapsychic motives in each of them, but also to the fact that Ferenczi’s contributions could only enter the psychoanalytic edifice as modifications to and expansions of Freud’s original invention. Consequently, Ferenczi could not state ideas about psychoanalysis without relating them to Freud one way or another. He could agree or disagree; he could support or dissent—but he was not in a position to step aside to make independent statements without their being construed as comments on Freud’s work. In turn, the content of Ferenczi’s ideas was equally tethered to Freud, by design. I imagine that the inescapability of this predicament played some role in Ferenczi’s overwhelming interest in the analytic relationship and relationships in general: The core of his theorizing was the relational meaning of any communication that takes place between analyst and patient, child and parent. In contrast, Freud, as the inventor/father, could emphasize the independent power of the interpretation. In Freud’s mind (and in his followers’ minds, as well) his clinical theories stood on their own and had inherent credibility. Their value was not measured against an originator’s thoughts, because he was that originator. This is how it was constructed.

The widely held notion that Ferenczi’s emphasis on empathy and mu-
tual consideration in psychoanalysis was a function of neurotic dependency, whereas Freud’s analytic behaviors reflected his scientific approach to the psyche, may have stemmed from this situational imbalance as much as from their personality differences and neuroses. In other words, one could argue that Ferenczi’s focus on experience, interrelatedness, and mutuality, and Freud’s conceptualization of the analyst’s role as standing outside and above the interpersonal field, directly reflects their positions in the developing sociopolitical field of psychoanalysis at the time, in which they fulfilled different roles.

But applying notions of balance and mutuality in the psychoanalytic process to Freud may have caused an internal conflict for Ferenczi (as well as an interpersonal one), because he also needed to see—and did see—Freud as someone who stood outside of and above the neurotic-relational context. This latter perception agreed with Freud’s, who resisted the idea of mutuality. Perhaps by becoming Freud’s patient, Ferenczi hoped to resolve this conflict. On the one hand, by establishing a patient-analyst relationship, they could consciously agree that Freud was the analyst with superior knowledge within their shared interpersonal field. Simultaneously, in the larger context of the psychoanalytic world, Ferenczi forced Freud into a relationship that went beyond the hierarchy that Freud demanded, thereby pushing Freud to enter a version of his own original, interpersonally bound, predicament. In other words, when Freud and Ferenczi talked about the psychoanalytic process from then on, they could no longer agree or disagree as colleagues about some impersonal theoretical concept, but they also, inevitably, reflected on their own patient-analyst relationship with one another.

Psychoanalysis belonged to Freud: He knew it best and even if there were relational complications, he treated his own insights about the analytic process as the encapsulation of some objective truth precisely because he “invented” it (Freud, 1917). Psychoanalysis was Freud’s child. Consistent with childrearing practices of the time and how their meaning was socially constructed (at that time), with the parent as ultimate teacher and authority, in his clinical practice Freud brought analysis and meaning to his patients; he gave it to them as an authority who knew better. Ferenczi, on the other hand, played the role of a negotiator between the patient’s actual experience in the consulting room and Freud’s psychoanalytic “knowledge,” giving equal importance to both, always questioning what he and his patients knew about the process and each other. In this way, perhaps Ferenczi was mirroring his own questions in relation to
Freud. Although also espousing Freud’s child (i.e., psychoanalysis), he remained in a position of a child himself.

To stay with the metaphor, Freud, the father, wanted to see psychoanalysis 1) take its own course and become independent from him to ensure its survival, and 2) remain under his (i.e., Freud’s) control, and stay true to its tenets, without “distortions” and “misconceptions.” Freud was looking for someone he could trust in both these respects; he sought followers who would protect and preserve—and yet also help change—psychoanalysis, as long as the changes preserved his ideas and position as father.

Hence, Ferenczi wasn’t just the intellectual and transferential son to Freud, as has been often stated, but he was the son-in-law—which, apparently, Freud had explicit fantasies about (Dupont, 1994). Ferenczi was continuously evaluated on whether he was fit to take good care of psychoanalysis (metaphorically, the daughter); he was also always and inevitably compared to the father, Freud, internally and externally. In this context, it is particularly interesting to think about Ferenczi’s love affair with his own lover’s (Gizella Palos’s) daughter, Edna, a patient of his. Subsequently, Ferenczi sent Edna to Freud for analysis, and then at the “father’s” advice—and despite his own original intentions—he decided to marry Gizella, Edna’s mother (Stanton, 1991). Ferenczi’s transference to Freud, along with Freud’s comfort with authority and the belief that he knew best, led to these decisions. Throughout the rest of his life, Ferenczi grappled with this drama (Stanton, 1991). Despite its scars, it forced him to recognize that every psychoanalytic intervention had—in addition to its content—its own relational meaning and impact between patient and therapist.

Ferenczi’s attempts to have Freud appreciate mutuality in psychoanalysis seem to speak to two goals: 1) to demonstrate that he, Ferenczi, did attend to Freud’s need to have someone love and take care of psychoanalysis, while respecting the father’s authority; and 2) to make Freud take responsibility for these expectations and his own conflicts around them. But above and beyond his own intrapsychic needs for an accepting father and a wise master, Ferenczi also needed Freud’s actual appreciation, positive regard, and expertise in order to enter into “psychoanalysis,” i.e., to become a psychoanalyst. So, when Freud attributed Ferenczi’s issues with him exclusively to Ferenczi’s needs and conflicts, he failed to recognize the practical (i.e., social) reality in Ferenczi’s characterological defenses. Indeed, Freud was the central, most powerful
figure of a new discipline, and he had what was considered superior knowledge. Thus, in his eyes, it was Ferenczi’s job to come to terms with both the master’s insights about his psyche and his limitations. In contrast, Ferenczi emphasized the intersubjective dimension, in which he and Freud equally and mutually needed, helped, and hindered each other in their own ways. By seeking Freud’s recognition and approval of this idea as it applied to their own relationship, however, Ferenczi set himself up to be even more dependent on Freud, thus lending credibility, and perhaps truth, to Freud’s assertions that Ferenczi’s dependence issues were unresolved.

Ferenczi’s reputation in the field of psychoanalysis was, and still is, complicated. First, his focus on the analytic relationship and his advocacy for love and flexibility toward patients was seen for a long time as a neurotic reaction to Freud’s subjectively perceived emotional unavailability towards him. This is Jones’s (and to some degree, Freud’s) angle on him, which ultimately resulted in rumors about Ferenczi’s mental instability. Second, his difficulty fully embracing his own ideas about psychoanalysis until late in life has also been considered a sign of his neurosis—i.e., a sign that he was inadequately separated from the father figure (Schwarzenbach, 2001). Actually, this was Ferenczi’s personal perspective, as well as the perspective of current thinkers who have the historical vantage point to know the impact of Ferenczi’s work on our current theoretical preoccupations. Paradoxically, the fact that today, Ferenczi’s dissenting approach has so much credibility and meaning for the analytic situation makes him appear more neurotic for not having believed in himself and only slowly having come to trust his innovations.

When Ferenczi attempted to emphasize, call attention to, and then directly involve Freud in a mutual analysis, thereby leveling the playing field, this must have seemed, at the time, a sign of his own failure to appreciate the reality of the social situation between himself and Freud, and between patients and analysts in general. It is taking it only one step further, from a perspective inside “psychoanalysis” to assume that he was mentally unstable, and to assign this instability to his preexisting dependency. It is hard to believe that this was done with no recognition of the irony.

One may speculate that Ferenczi wanted to analyze Freud in order to “fix” him, i.e., so Freud could become a better analyst to him. But Ferenczi could (or perhaps should) have known that Freud could not accept his invitation to be analyzed by him. In Freud’s mind, psycho-
analysis was about gaining insight into one’s neurosis through receiving knowledge from a benevolent, objective, and impersonal authority: he certainly did not consider Ferenczi an authority over himself, let alone impersonal, objective, or fully benevolent. He couldn’t accept the invitation because his own defenses were so reinforced by the social reality. Agreeing to the proposal would have undermined Freud’s own sense of reality to some degree.

Ferenczi’s assertion of his own authority can be seen as having enabled him to offer psychoanalysis to Freud, but it had to draw on his own separate way of thinking about psychoanalysis, which emphasized mutuality, personal connection, and a continuous battle against the assumed (not earned) authority of the all-knowing analyst. By suggesting that Freud be analyzed, Ferenczi failed to appreciate the threat he posed to Freud and, hence, he provoked his own condemnation to some degree. The situation also reflected differences not just in their specific attitudes towards analytic concepts and technique, but in their broader social values and relationships to tradition, rules, and societal order. This was in part due to their families’ divergent social backgrounds: Ferenczi’s more progressive attitude posed an inherent threat to Freud’s more traditional outlook.

The ease with which Ferenczi could offer to analyze Freud and thereby flaunt tradition can be linked to the nonconformity of his family of origin. He grew up with a father who deeply identified with socially and culturally progressive ideals, and changed his name from Fraenkl to Ferenczi to demonstrate his wish to assimilate to the subversive aspects of the dominant Hungarian culture. The father’s publishing office in Miskolcz (Hungary) printed all the postrevolutionary poems of the protestant pastor, Mihály Tompa, and the progressive spirit pervaded Ferenczi’s private life and work throughout his lifetime. In contrast, Freud grew up in a bourgeois, traditional middle-class household, where the family’s place in society was simultaneously more stable, accommodating with the conservative aspects of the dominant Austrian culture, while also retaining more of its Jewish cultural heritage. Freud could then easily experience Ferenczi’s offer as an expression of his inclination to subvert rules in general, his rules in particular, and, ultimately, himself.

Finally, Ferenczi’s proposal to psychoanalyze Freud has also been viewed as an example of the maternal defense (Schwarzenbach, 2001). Schwarzenbach sees this maternal defense as exemplified by Ferenczi’s overextended kindness towards patients, which, perhaps, concealed and
compensated for (i.e., was a defense against—a reaction formation) his negative feelings toward strong women and illness itself. According to Schwarzenbach, Ferenczi experienced his mother as distant, withholding, and powerful. He believes Ferenczi offered psychoanalysis to Freud in an unconscious wish to cure Freud of this transferential mother, although locating the source of emotional distance in “her” and not in himself. In doing so, perhaps, Ferenczi could deny his own fear, even hatred, of women.

As Ferenczi began to analyze his maternal defense, which diminished his wish to change Freud and seek his approval, he understood what Freud had been advocating all along. Paradoxically, as Ferenczi became more independent he came closer to what Freud imagined for him. As he accepted the lack of explicit, accepted mutuality in their relationship, his effort to change it lessened. Embracing his own ideas without Freud’s approval was a way of internally diminishing Freud’s power to legitimize his clinical theory. It could be argued that this transformation occurred in part because Ferenczi’s social and family background offered him a constructive, viable alternative to the traditional way of approaching power and authority. He developed a personal stance that allowed him to exist side by side with Freud’s authority without pleading with or challenging the psychoanalytic “father.” It seems to me that towards the end of his life, having worked through his resistances, Ferenczi was finally able to embrace the identity that he chose for himself in the first place: being the enfant terrible of psychoanalysis (Ferenczi, 1931/1955, p. 127). By integrating his dependence and affectionate nature as well as his “terribleness” (i.e., subversiveness) into his way of working, by accepting and acknowledging his difference, he stopped needing to submit to—and unconsciously rebel against—Freud, to “kill him” or dominate him in some other way. The schema of these struggles can also be found in the relationship between Hungary and Austria, to which we now turn.

The International Political Context and Its Implications

As noted above, the contention of this article is that some of what accounts for the differences between Freud and Ferenczi in their approaches to psychoanalysis are their disparate values, societal standing, and family histories. Taking the argument one step further, we have to acknowledge that Freud’s more bourgeois, middle-class background made him more conservative as well as more prone to assuming power,
because assuming power was a function of living in a generally more conservative, hierarchical society. Ferenczi’s family, especially his idealized father, was representative of the contemporary spirit of the Hungarian society that was, at the beginning of the 20th century, more egalitarian than the Austro-Hungarian Empire due to strong influences from French culture and revolutionary ideals. The differences in how the two men related to their Jewish heritage also reflected wider societal processes. Freud called himself a “godless Jew,” which meant a nonreligious person with a deep solidarity to his ethnic community (Freud, 1939/1963). He also thought of his Jewishness as a source of his independent thinking and his highly developed ability to tolerate being an outsider (e.g., Roazen, 1992). Freud simultaneously wished to conquer the Christian world with his ideas: In this wish, we can further trace his conviction that standing apart from mainstream society was inevitable, the only question being whether he would dominate or be dominated by the majority culture. In Hungary, the Jewish bourgeoisie was more successfully assimilated into Hungarian culture. Less and less Yiddish was spoken and many didn’t go to the synagogue any more (Fejtö, 1996). Ferenczi’s father’s decision to change his name reflected a more general trend. When nationalism grew and the first anti-Semitic laws were introduced in both countries, Ferenczi’s core identity was shaken in a way that could not apply to Freud; he essentially had to ask himself the question whether he professed to be a Hungarian of Jewish religion or a Jew living in Hungary.

Beyond just comparing the two societies, we gain further insight into the Freud/Ferenczi dynamic by exploring the relationship that existed directly between their respective countries. Freud was born in Moravia, but spent his life in Austria, whereas Ferenczi was born and raised in Hungary, and returned there after completing his medical training and military duties. Within the Austro-Hungarian Empire, Freud belonged to the more powerful and oppressive country of the two, whereas Ferenczi belonged to the powerless one that was ruled by the other. The two countries had been living together under various forms since the 1520s, which was the first time the Hungarian parliament elected a Habsburg king to gain military and financial support in order to resist the expanding Ottoman Empire (called the “Turks”). The Habsburgs welcomed this alliance, considering Hungary the “last bastion” before the Turks would be able to reach Vienna. For over 150 years, nearly continuous battles took place, mostly on Hungarian land, between the Austro-Hungarian
Empire and the Ottoman Empire, which ended with the Turk’s defeat and retreat into the Balkans. Over the centuries, the Ottomans were regarded as the primary enemy of the Habsburg countries, so it is particularly interesting that Freud called Ferenczi affectionately his “Grand Vizir” (see Freud’s letter to Ferenczi on December 13, 1929, Freud & Ferenczi, 1996), the highest representative of the common enemies. Although expressing respect for him and often talking about him as his future descendant, Freud may have also experienced Ferenczi as a threatening presence, someone who would want to take over his empire and do away with him.

Within the Austro-Hungarian Empire, Hungarians grappled with the issue of independence from foreign rule for many centuries, and two major trends emerged as they tried to find a solution. One was to separate completely from Austria and establish an independent state; the other was to gain independent rights while staying under the umbrella of the Empire. The conflict between the two approaches followed from two considerations. First, that development is inevitably stifled under foreign rule; second, that Hungary could not stand on its own, because excluding itself from Europe would set back development and be a self-sabotaging strategy in the long run. As part of the first type of solution, a revolution took place in 1848–1849, which ended with the public hanging of the 13 Hungarian admirals who led the attempt to bring about political separation. Ferenczi’s father fought in that war, so his family was directly implicated in these political events. As part of the second type of solution, in 1868 a pact was signed that gave some limited freedoms to Hungary, including the designation of Hungarian as the official language of the country, and this played an important role in the cultural blossoming at the turn of the century. During World War I, Ferenczi served as a doctor in the joint Austro-Hungarian Army after completing his medical training and before returning to Hungary to practice psychoanalysis. At the end of the War, following the dissolution of the Empire in 1920, Hungary lost a considerable portion of its land, most notably Transylvania, and needed to establish its own independent internal organization as a state. There were considerable difficulties in developing these new political structures, in part because the country lacked infrastructure and experience due to the fact that it had been functioning for so long under externally imposed rules. The country’s resources and needs were also different from those of the Empire or Austria, so the political arrangements of the previous era could not
be easily adapted or internalized. Yet, following a brief communist period, previous structures did serve as a model for new ones and the alliance with Germany and Austria was reestablished. The loss of the World War II and the inherent political instability left the country vulnerable to yet another invasion, this time by the Soviets only a couple of decades later, and Hungary was placed under Soviet hegemony, which lasted until 1989.

It is striking how Ferenczi’s struggles to individuate yet needing acceptance and support from Freud parallel, to a great degree, what happened between their two countries during a similar time frame. As noted above, in the midst of trying to shake the Habsburg rule, Hungary was highly divided. According to many, the only viable future for the country was to stay connected to and be accepted by the West, whereas others thought it was time to turn back towards the East and fight the oppression. Over many decades, Hungary as a whole did both, and until the Habsburg Empire fell apart, Hungary was ambivalent toward and dependent upon the Austrian state. All this determined the general atmosphere within which Freud and Ferenczi functioned. Their relative power toward one another took place in the context of similar power dynamics on a larger scale, which not only affected how they viewed one another, but also how they viewed and developed different attitudes towards power itself, which lies close to the core of their disagreement about psychoanalytic theory and practice.

Specifically, Freud was much less ambivalent about becoming the authority and having more power than his patients and followers. Ferenczi, on the other hand, always seemed conflicted about having power, and ultimately developed a clinical method and theory in which the analyst’s power and knowledge is derived from the ability to surrender power to the psychoanalytic process. In Freud’s world, having power seemed to imply that he had the right (and the truth) to give direction and insight. Freud was also hypersensitive to potentially losing power, and his interpersonal reactions to his followers, in part, originated in the sense that they may want to take power over or away from him.

As for Ferenczi, he certainly occupied the powerless position toward Freud, reflecting the countries’ political history as well as the plain reality of psychoanalytic politics. Ferenczi depended greatly on Freud for access to the international psychoanalytic scene and for developing his ideas, although he resented this relative powerlessness. Given how much he expected and needed approval, guidance, and acknowledgment, as well
as independence from Freud, power, for Ferenczi, came to be associated with responsibility and interpersonal obligation. This way of thinking about power enabled him to achieve emotional openness and a relative balance of power with his patients, who were in the less powerful position vis-à-vis the analyst. It seems that for Freud, being in power came naturally, and he did not question the dynamics of power differentials. He was also less attuned to or aware of its interpersonal effects than Ferenczi, who came from the position of the oppressed. Consistent with social psychological findings, Freud’s higher level of power may have even been relevant to being less emotionally responsive and expressive in the face of his patients’ suffering (e.g., Van Kleef, Oveis, Van der Löwe, LuoKogan, Goetz, & Keltner, 2008). In contrast, Ferenczi explicitly—maybe even to an extreme degree—wanted to avoid solving differences or disagreements by relying on his authority, power, and superior knowledge so as to not overrule the other’s experiences and concerns. (I think this is an important reason why he ultimately was able to analyze his own maternal defense.) Given that Ferenczi spent much of his life in an externally ruled country, his basic stance in life and in psychoanalysis (as the enfant terrible) was that power belonged to the other, for whom he longed but against whom he also rebelled. He attached expectations of being cared for by the power of the other, but he also wanted to avoid having that power himself. He was less aware of the ways in which he gave power away, the ways in which he consented to the hierarchy he criticized. There is no “enfant” without a parent and there is no “terrible” without defining “good” or “appropriate.” As his need for approval and disapproval by Freud loosened, Ferenczi faced the task of forming an independent adult identity that could no longer remain an oppositional one.

In this, the parallel between the Freud-Ferenczi relationship and the relations between their countries is again worth noting. Hungary was ruled, not simply abused or exploited, by Austria. Hungarians, as discussed, also looked to Austria and the court for direction, example, and protection. Disappointment was unavoidable, as was the ensuing conflict about separation. The possible establishment of an independent Hungarian state was a threat to the very existence of the Empire and, in that sense, the dependence between them was mutual—much like Freud, who could not be teacher and guru without followers, and his followers could not feel validated without Freud. But Freud’s own dependence on these followers seemed to make him overly sensitive, considering
attempts for independence as attempts to take over and ultimately kill the master/father. In terms of politics, which I think applies to Ferenczi personally, too, Hungary did not see itself capable of such a feat; equality and balance of power seemed an unattainable goal. Some of the prevalent ideas of those times about turning from the West to the East for support reflect more of an avoidant than an attacking, conquering attitude. These ideas, or fantasies, also speak to the fear of (or aversion to) existing independently—taking authority and control over one’s own destiny. When, towards the end of his life, Ferenczi stopped thinking of Freud as the ultimate source of accreditation and legitimacy of his own clinical ideas, he asserted his own power, reclaiming it from “the father.” He did this internally. He did not try to deny the validity of Freud’s theories, nor did he usurp his place in the field of psychoanalysis, i.e., “kill the father.” Rather, he established his autonomous clinical self outside of—and next to—Freud’s classical analytic rule, as a more progressive alternative.

In Closing

My intent in this article was to emphasize that the external structure of our sociopolitical world often has unexamined, yet profound, effects on how our interpersonal social life and internal psychic activities unfold. Speaking as much to current political issues within the field of psychoanalysis as to the historical events, I have tried to show that Freud’s hierarchical model of psychoanalysis was born in part out of a hierarchical way of thinking in his contemporary society, validated by all others participating in the system. To criticize Freud and come up with a viable alternative, Ferenczi needed the more egalitarian and progressive experiences of his own background; by overcoming the limitations imposed by his own beliefs in Freud’s worldview, he had to develop a way of being that followed different rules, rules that were not intended to take the place of the old ones, but to allow for plurality. When Freud was not operating within his more ambivalent, paranoid mode, he appreciated these cultural differences by calling Ferenczi a “familiar stranger” who came from an exotic, beautiful world that was “scientifically different” from his own (Eros, 2004).

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